Tyrrell_McAllister comments on The role of mathematical truths - Less Wrong

14 Post author: SilasBarta 24 April 2010 04:59PM

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Comment author: Tyrrell_McAllister 26 April 2010 08:45:01PM *  1 point [-]

Why? The constraint that a system output a "string" is too strict; it suffices that they output something interpretable as a string.

I agree now that "string" is too strict. I should have said "symbol", where a symbol is anything with physical tokens. My proposed label is now

Physical system S outputs the symbol A whenever it is fed the symbol B

where

  • "S" is the name of a specific concrete physical system, and

  • "A" and "B" are the names of specific physically-manifested symbols,

such that a token of the symbol A physically makes S output a token of the symbol B in a way that is isomorphic to the way that the rules of arithmetic logically imply that 2+2=4.

I think that the work that you want to do by adding the word "interpretable" to the label is done by my conditions on what S, A, and B are.

An isomorphism M is a one-to-one mapping between two phenomena X and Y. In this context, then, the physical referent of M is whatever physically encodes how to identify what in Y it is that the aspects of X map to.

Then you should be able to make the label refer directly to that physical encoding of M. That is, instead of mentioning the isomorphism M, you ought to be able to refer just to some specific physical system T that "encodes" M in the same way that my physical system S above encodes the operation of adding 2 to 2.

However, if you're still unhappy with my label, then you would probably be unhappy with this unpacking of your reference to M. But I can think of no other way to make good your claim to refer only to physical things.

(A strict platonist would say that even my label refers to nonphysical things, because it refers to symbols, only the tokens of which are physical. I'm happy to ignore this.)

Comment author: SilasBarta 26 April 2010 09:29:06PM 0 points [-]

Then you should be able to make the label refer directly to that physical encoding of M. ... you ought to be able to refer just to some specific physical system T that "encodes" M ... if you're still unhappy with my label, then you would probably be unhappy with this unpacking of your reference to M. But I can think of no other way to make good your claim to refer only to physical things.

Well, I would need to permit more than just one physical encoding; I'd need to permit any physical encoding that is, er, isomorphic to an arbitrary one of them. But I don't see this as being a problem -- it's like what they do with NP-completeness. You can select one (arbitrary) problem as being NP-complete, and then define NP-completeness as "that problem, plus any one convertible to it".

So it appears I can avoid binding the meaning to one specific physical system, while still using only physical referents. And yes, your updated terminology is fine as long as you allow "symbols" and "fed" to have sufficiently broad meanings.

Incidentally, are you saying the same problem arises for defining "waves"? Do you think that referring to one particular wave requires you to reference something non-physical? Would you say waves are partly non-physical?

Comment author: zero_call 26 April 2010 09:26:36PM *  0 points [-]

M as an isomorphism is just an interpretation between things (rocks, birds, etc.) and "math things" (numbers, etc.) Its physical referent is the human mental instantiation of that interpretation (e.g., in the form of neutro transmitters or what have you.) However, (see my comment a little above), I don't think this is what you were getting at.