byrnema comments on Attention Less Wrong: We need an FAQ - Less Wrong

11 Post author: Kevin 27 April 2010 10:06AM

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Comment author: byrnema 29 April 2010 06:48:40PM 0 points [-]

Using your framing regarding what it is that we are discussing (framings cannot be avoided), perhaps I disagree with your interpretation of the phrase 'mind dependent'.

The article writes:

In either case, it may be that what determines the difference in the two contexts is something “mind-dependent”—in which case it would be subjectivist relativism—but it need not be. Perhaps what determines the relevant difference is an entirely mind-independent affair, making for an objectivist relativism.

The article does not actually define mind-dependent. I think that by "mind-dependent", the article means that it a mind that is doing the calculation and that assigns the morality, whereas if I am understanding your position (for example), you seem to think that "mind-dependent" means that an entity being labeled moral must have a mind. In the first paragraph of my last comment, I argued that this sense of mind-dependent would make "objective morality" more or less moot, because we hardly every talk about the morality of mindless entities.

Tyrell McAllister writes:

But they are not subjectivist because they measure morality according to something independent of anyone's state of mind.

His understanding of subjectivist also seems to interpret 'mind-dependent' as requiring a mind to do the measuring.

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 29 April 2010 07:41:17PM *  0 points [-]

We seem to be talking past each other, but I'm not entirely sure where the misunderstanding is, so I'll just lay out my view of what the article says again in different terms.

A morality is subjective iff you have to look at the mind of an agent in order to determine whether they are moral. e.g., morality as preferences. A morality is objective iff you don't look at the mind of an agent in order to determine whether they are moral. For example, a single morality "written into the fabric of the universe," or a morality that says what is moral for an agent depends on where in the universe the agent happens to be (note that the former is not relative and the latter is, but I don't think we're disagreeing on what that means).

In both cases, the only type of thing being called moral is something with a mind (whatever "mind" means here). The difference is whether or not you have to look inside the mind to determine the morality of the agent.

So I'm not saying that mind dependent vs. indenpendent is the difference between having a mind and not having a mind, its the difference between looking at the mind that the agent is assumed to have and not looking at it.

Comment author: byrnema 29 April 2010 08:09:49PM *  3 points [-]

That is more clear, but still describes what I thought I understood of your position. It's rather unconventional, so it took me a while to be certain what you meant.

I think that 'subjective' means that a mind is assessing the morality. The key idea is that different minds could assign different moral judgements, so the judgement is mind-dependent.

In contrast, any morality that considers the state of an agent's mind in the computation of that agent's morality can be either objective or subjective.

For example, suppose it was written on a tablet, "the action of every agent is moral unless it is done with the purpose of harming another agent". The tablet-law is still objective, but the computation of the morality of an action depends on the agent's intention (and mind).

I just experienced a flicker of a different understanding, that helps me to relate to your concept of subjective. Suppose there were two tablets:

Tablet A: The action of every agent is moral unless it harms another agent.

Tablet B: The action of every agent is moral unless it is done with the purpose of harming another agent.

Tablet A measures morality based on the absolute, objective result of an action, whereas Tablet B considers the intention of an action.

Whereas this is an important distinction between the tablets, we don't say that Tablet A is an objective morality and Tablet B is a subjective morality. There must be other terms for this distinction. I know that Tablet A is like consequentialism, and Tablet B includes, for example, virtue ethics.

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 30 April 2010 02:04:35AM 0 points [-]

It's rather unconventional, so it took me a while to be certain what you meant.

I was just giving my interpretation of the article's definitions. Do you think my interpretation is unconventional?

I don't think I disagree with you about how to parse mind-dependent, I've just been sloppy in putting it into a definition. I would call both tablet A and tablet B objective/mind independent

So how about this for a definition of mind-dependent:

The "source" of what is moral for an agent depends on the mind of the agent.

Comment author: Jack 29 April 2010 08:21:09PM *  0 points [-]

If I understand you correctly this is my interpretation as well. But to clarify: there doesn't even have to be an agent in the judgment itself. Take the proposed judgment: "Black holes are immoral". This can either be subjective or objective. You are an objectivist if you look to something other than a mind to determine it's truth value. If you think the fact about whether or not black holes are immoral can be found by looking at the universe or examining black holes, you're an objectivist. If you ask "How do I feel about black holes", "How does my society feel about black holes" or "How does God feel about black holes" you are a subjectivist because to determine whether or not to accede to a judgment you examine a mind of minds.

Edit: I just read byrnema's comment and now I think I probably don't agree with you. You could also be an objectivist or subjectivist about a judgement of a purely mental fact.

Objectivist: Jealousy is immoral because it was written onto the side all quarks.

Subjectivist: Jealousy is immoral because I don't like jealousy.

Comment author: byrnema 29 April 2010 08:39:24PM *  0 points [-]

I agree with everything in your first paragraph, and was amazed it wasn't addressed to me. I can't believe how complicated this turns out being due to semantics. We could really use a good systemizer in the whole morality field, to clear the confusion of these tortuously ambiguous terms. (I should add that I'm not aware that there isn't one, but just skimming through this thread and its sisters seems to indicate one is needed.)

Comment author: Jack 29 April 2010 08:57:59PM 2 points [-]

The wikipedia entry turns out to be a really, really, excellent starting point.

Comment author: thomblake 29 April 2010 09:00:17PM 1 point [-]

As usual, SEP is more thorough but worse at giving you the at-a-glance summary.

Comment author: Jack 29 April 2010 08:48:42PM 1 point [-]

Lol, it might as well have been. I couldn't figure out which one of you had it wrong so I just replied to the most recent comment.

I'll try to put together a map or diagram for positions in metaethics.

Comment author: thomblake 29 April 2010 08:53:06PM 0 points [-]

I'm not sure if we have a bona fide expert on metaethics hereabouts. Meta-anything gets squirrely if you're not being really careful.