timtyler comments on Beauty quips, "I'd shut up and multiply!" - Less Wrong

6 Post author: neq1 07 May 2010 02:34PM

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Comment deleted 07 May 2010 04:39:06PM *  [-]
Comment author: timtyler 09 May 2010 01:56:02PM *  1 point [-]

Re: "But if we specify that the money will be put into an account (and she will only be paid one winning) that she can spend after the experiment is over, which is next week, then she will find that 1/2 is the "right" answer"

That seems like a rather bizarre way to interpret: "What is your credence NOW for the proposition that our coin landed heads?" [emphasis added]

Comment author: neq1 10 May 2010 01:19:10PM 0 points [-]

NOW. One bet.

Again, consider the scenario where at each awakening we offer a bet where she'd lose $1.50 if heads and win $1 if tails, and we tell her that we will only accept whichever bet she made on the final interview.

If her credence for heads on an awakening, on every awakening (she can't distinguish between awakenings), really was 1/3, she would agree to accept the bet. But we all know accepting the bet would be irrational. Thus, her credence for heads on an awakening is not 1/3.

Comment author: timtyler 10 May 2010 06:04:06PM *  1 point [-]

So: you are debating what:

"What is your credence now for the proposition that our coin landed heads?"

...actually means. Personally, I think your position on that is indefensible.

This would make it clear exactly where the problem lies - if not for the fact that you also appear to be in a complete muddle about how many times Beauty awakens and is interviewed.

Comment author: neq1 11 May 2010 02:11:00AM -1 points [-]

We both know what question is being asked. We both know how many times she awakens and is interviewed. I know what subjective probability is (I assume you do too). I showed you my math. I also explained why your ratio of expected frequencies does not correspond to the subjective probability that you think it does.

Comment author: mattnewport 11 May 2010 04:33:44AM 3 points [-]

Does it not concern you even a little that the Wikipedia article you linked to quite clearly says you are wrong and explains why?

Comment author: neq1 11 May 2010 11:11:29AM 0 points [-]

I started by reading the wikipedia page. At that point, the 1/3 solution made some sense to me, but I was bothered by the fact that you couldn't derive it from probability laws. I then read articles by Bostrom and Radford. I spent a lot of time working on the problem, etc. Eventually, I figured out precisely why the 1/3 solution is wrong.

Is Wikipedia a stronger authority than me here? Probably. But I know where the argument there fails, so it's not very convincing.

Comment author: timtyler 11 May 2010 06:53:58AM 1 point [-]

I think we are nearing the end here. Someone just wrote a whole post explaining why the correct answer is 1/3: http://lesswrong.com/lw/28u/conditioning_on_observers/

Comment author: neq1 11 May 2010 11:15:13AM 1 point [-]

It's fascinating to me that you won't tell me which probability is wrong, p(H)=1/2, P(monday|H)=1

It's also interesting that you won't defend your answer (other than saying I'm wrong). You are in a situation where the number of trials depends on outcome, but are using an estimator that is valid for independent trials. Show me that yours converges to a probability. Standard theory doesn't hold here.

Comment author: timtyler 11 May 2010 05:38:58PM *  0 points [-]

Probabilities are subjective. From Beauty's POV, if she has just awakened to face an interview, then p(H)=1/3. If she has learned that is Friday and the experiment is over, (but she has not yet been told which side the coin came down), then she updates on that info, and then p(H)=1/2. So, the value of p(H) depends on who is being asked - and on what information they have at the time.

Comment author: jimrandomh 11 May 2010 03:42:34PM *  0 points [-]

It's the first one - P(H)=1/2 is wrong. Before going any further, we should adopt Jaynes' habit of always labelling the prior knowledge in our probabilities, because there are in fact two probabilities that we care about: P(H|the experiment ran), and P(H|Sleeping Beauty has just been woken). These are 1/2 and 1/3, respectively. The first of these probabilities is given in the problem statement, but the second is what is asked for, and what should be used for calculating expected value in any betting, because any bets made occur twice if the coin was tails.

Comment author: neq1 11 May 2010 04:10:03PM *  1 point [-]

How can these things be different, P(H|the experiment ran) and P(H|Sleeping Beauty has just been woken)?

Yes, a bet would occur twice if tails, if you set the problem up that way. But the question has to do with her credence at an awakening.

The 1/3 calculation is derived from treating the 3 counts as if they arose from independent draws of a mulitinomial distribution. They are not independent draws. There is 1 degree of freedom, not 2. Thus, the ratio that lead to the 1/3 value is not the probability that people seem to think it is. It's not clear that the ratio is a probability at all.

Comment author: jimrandomh 11 May 2010 04:32:12PM 1 point [-]

What's this about a multinomial distribution and degrees of freedom? I calculated P(H|W) as E(occurances of H&&W)/E(occurances of W) = (1/2)/(3/2) = 1/3.