I am almost certain that I am simply not conveying what I mean - I don't think you're self-aggrandizing, I think you're as frustrated as I am with this obstinate (apparent?) disagreement.

I'm going to describe a concrete example. If you're right, you should be able to either (a) explain how to perform a money-pump on the agent described, or (b) explain why the agent described constitutes a special case. If I'm right, you should be able to describe the difference between the agent that would suffer preference reversals and the agent described.

Let t represent the number of years since 2000 C.E. Let E(t) represent an earnings stream - between time t and time t+dt, the agent gains revenue E(t)*dt. Let r(t) represent the instantaneous discount rate at time t. And let P(E) represent the value of earnings stream E to the agent at the year 2000. (The agent is indifferent between earnings stream E and immediate revenue P.)

When r(t) = r is a constant, we can easily calculate the present value of any instantaneous future earnings dE at time t:

which corresponds to the simple formula

I maintain that this last formula,

still holds when r is no longer a constant, and therefore (as dE = E(t)dt):

Note that for the special case of F_t - future earnings at time t - we have