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NihilCredo comments on Taking the awkwardness out of a Prenup - A Game Theoretic solution - Less Wrong
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I don't know game theory very well, but wouldn't this only work as long as not everyone did it. Using the car example, if these contracts were common practice, you could have one for 4000 and the dealer could have one for 5000, in which case you could not reach the pareto optimum.
In general, doesn't this infinitely regress up meta levels? Adopting precomittments is beneficial, so everyone adopts them, then pre-precomittments are beneficial... (up to some constraint from reality like being too young, although then parents might become involved)
Is this (like some of Schelling's stuff I've read) more instrumental than pure game theory? I can see how this would work in the real world, but I'm not sure that it would work in theory. (Please feel free to correct any and all of my game theory)
The car example has the two actors signing contracts with opposing goals.
I can't see why someone would set up beforehand a contract that prevented them from signing a prenup. The reluctance to prenuptial arrangements only appears after you've met "the one", and all that the anti-prenup actor is concerned with is the motivation of the pro-prenup actor, and signing a counter-contract won't allay that.