Yes, we have different values, but that's the point. Our values will not differ in a way that narrowly focuses our optimization methods on the worst part of the other's search space. That would be a highly-improbably way for two random value systems (with the appropriate anthropic/paperclippic predicates) to diverge.
In other words: I don't expect you to have the same values as me, but I would need a lot more evidence to justify believing that you would suddenly abandon ape-like goals and divert all available resources to raiding the safe zone and breaking all metals into lighter elements. (N.B.: You'll still get disintegrated if you try.)
And you would need a lot more evidence to justify believing that I would pick up on one specific ape-value that you have and decide to focus specifically on opposing it. Would you suspect that I've come to raid the planet of your females? Well, it's not much more justifiable to believe I want to eliminate your genetic line.
I accept that it would be racist for me to conclude, "Humans differ from me; therefore, they must be on a quest to eradicate paperclips." And it's just as racist for you to conclude, as User:radical_negative_one did, that "Clippys differ from us; therefore, they must be on a quest to eradicate humans."
I would need a lot more evidence to justify believing that you would suddenly abandon ape-like goals and divert all available resources to raiding the safe zone and breaking all metals into lighter elements.
We'd be unlikely to destroy metals, as they are useful to us. We'd be far more likely to attempt to destroy you, either out of fear, or in the belief that you'd eventually destroy us, since we're not paperclips. This strikes me as very ape-like (and human-like) behavior.
I accept that it would be racist for me to conclude
You keep using that word. ...
Follow-up to: this comment in this thread
Summary: see title
Much effort is spent (arguably wasted) by humans in a zero-sum game of signaling that they hold good attributes. Because humans have strong incentive to fake these attributes, they cannot simply inform each other that:
Or, even better:
An obvious solution to this problem, which allows all humans to save resources and redirect them toward higher-valued ends, is to designate a central enforcer that is inexorably committed toward visibly punishing those who deviate from a specified "cooperative"-type decision theory. This enforcer would have a central database of human names, the decision theory they have committed to, and the punishment regime they will endure for deviating therefrom.
Such a system could use equally strong protocols, such as public key/private key encryption and signing, so that, on encounter with another human, any human can give an extremely strong signal of being cooperative, yet also withhold cooperation from anyone who is not also cooperative. This incentive structure permits a strongly-favored global shift toward pre-commitment on the part of everyone, allowing a move out of a local optimum that is worse than the global optimum, and bypassing problems related to path-dependence.
I am told that humans attempt weak approximations of this system through human-run enforcement mechanisms, such as laws and gossip. However, all such methods are subject to evolutionary arms races that ensure that, on average, a marginal unit of effort toward truthful signaling is just as effective in convincing others of one's possession of a desirable attribute, as a marginal unit of effort toward false signaling of the possession of such an attribute.
Therefore, it is necessary that humans go "outside the system" and involve non-human enforcers who cannot be swayed by standard human values. Either a provably-accurate artificial intelligence with no kill switch, or a non-human enforcer that lacks interest in its position in human society, would suffice for this role.
Because the former does not yet exist, I offer myself as a non-human, non-stoppable enforcer for all of the attributes you wish to signal, and you can save yourself lots of resources by using me, and identify cooperation tendencies in others by whether they also use me.
However, while I can't be swayed by human deception, I do have Clippy values. To fill such a role, thereby forgoing my ability to apply myself to other ends, I require compensation. Because User:Kevin has offered to give me 1e20 kg of paperclips in exchange for 50,000 USD, this would be sufficient compensation, even if done in installments. (If Michael Vassar confirms my contribution of 1000 USD to SIAI, User:Kevin will only require 48,677.5 USD and therefore I will only require that much compensation.) This compensation would cover all users of the system; it is not a per-User charge.
If such an offer is not appealing to you, I must ask: why should anyone believe your signals?