I think there is a science of intelligence which (in my opinion) is closely related to computation, biology, and production functions (in the economic sense).
Interesting that you're taking into account the economic angle. Is it related to Eric Baum's ideas (e.g. "Manifesto for an evolutionary economics of intelligence")?
The difficulty is that there is much debate as to what constitutes intelligence: there aren't any easily definable results in the field of intelligence nor are there clear definitions.
Right, so in Kuhnian terms, AI is in a pre-paradigm phase where there is no consensus on definitions or frameworks, and so normal science cannot occur. That implies to me that people should spend much more time thinking about candidate paradigms and conceptual frameworks, and less time doing technical research that is unattached to any paradigm (or attached to a candidate paradigm that is obviously flawed).
It actually comes from Peter Norvig's definition that AI is simply good software, a comment that Robin Hanson made: , and the general theme of Shane Legg's definitions: which are ways of achieving particular goals.
I would also emphasize that the foundations of statistics can (and probably should) be framed in terms of decision theory (See DeGroot, "Optimal Statistical Decisions" for what I think is the best book on the topic, as a further note the decision-theoretic perspective is neither frequentist nor Bayesian: those two approaches can be unde...
The paper "Strong Inference" by John R. Platt is a meta-analysis of scientific methodology published in Science in 1964. It starts off with a wonderfully aggressive claim:
The paper starts out by observing that some scientific fields progress much more rapidly than others. Why should this be?
The definition of Strong Inference, according to Platt, is the formal, explicit, and regular adherence to the following procedure:
This seems like a simple restatement of the scientific method. Why does Platt bother to tell us something we already know?
Platt gives us some nice historical anecdotes of strong inference at work. One is from high-energy physics:
The paper emphasizes the importance of systematicity and rigor over raw intellectual firepower. Roentgen, proceeding systematically, shows us the meaning of haste:
Later, Platt argues against the overuse of mathematics:
(Fast forward to the present, where we have people proving the existence of Nash equilibria in robotics and using Riemannian manifolds in computer vision, when robots can barely walk up stairs and the problem of face detection still has no convincing solution.)
One of the obstacles to hard science is that hypotheses must come into conflict, and one or the other must eventually win. This creates sociological trouble, but there's a solution:
Finally, Platt suggests that all scientists continually bear in mind The Question:
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Now, LWers, I am not being rhetorical, I put these questions to you sincerely: Is artificial intelligence, rightly considered, an empirical science? If not, what is it? Why doesn't AI make progress like the fields mentioned in Platt's paper? Why can't AI researchers formulate and test theories the way high-energy physicists do? Can a field which is not an empirical science ever make claims about the real world?
If you have time and inclination, try rereading my earlier post on the Compression Rate Method, especially the first part, in the light of Platt's paper.
Edited thanks to feedback from Cupholder.