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Will_Newsome comments on Abnormal Cryonics - Less Wrong
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What?! Roko, did you seriously not see the two points I had directly after the one about age? Especially the second one?! How is my lack of a strong preference to stay alive into the distant future a false preference? Because it's not a false belief.
Okay. Like I said, the one in a million thing is for myself. I think that most people, upon reflection (but not so much reflection as something like CEV requires), really would like to live far into the future, and thus should have probabilities much higher than 1 in a million.
We were talking about the probability of getting 'saved', and 'saved' to me requires that the future is suited such that I will upon reflection be thankful that I was revived instead of those resources being used for something else I would have liked to happen. In the vast majority of post-singularity worlds I do not think this will be the case. In fact, in the vast majority of post-singularity worlds, I think cryonics becomes plain irrelevant. And hence my sorta-extreme views on the subject.
I tried to make it clear in my post and when talking to both you and Vladimir Nesov that I prefer talking about 'probability that I will get enough utility to justify cryonics upon reflection' instead of 'probability that cryonics will result in revival, independent of whether or not that will be considered a good thing upon reflection'. That's why I put in the abnormally important footnote.
Cool, I'm glad to be talking about the same thing now! (I guess any sort of misunderstanding/argument causes me a decent amount of cognitive burden that I don't realize was there until after it is removed. Maybe a fear of missing an important point that I will be embarrassed about having ignored upon reflection. I wonder if Steve Rayhawk experiences similar feelings on a normal basis?)
Well here's a really simple, mostly qualitative analysis, with the hope that "Will" and "Roko" should be totally interchangeable.
Option 1: Will signs up for cryonics.
uFAI is developed before Will is cyopreserved. Signing up for cryonics doesn't work, but this possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
uFAI is developed after Will is cryopreserved. Signing up for cryonics doesn't work, but this possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
FAI is developed before Will is cryopreserved. Signing up for cryonics never gets a chance to work for Will specifically.
FAI is developed after Will is cryopreserved. Cryonics might work, depending on the implementation and results of things like CEV. This is a huge question mark for me. Something close to 50% is probably appropriate, but at times I have been known to say something closer to 5%, based on considerations like 'An FAI is not going to waste resources reviving you: rather, it will spend resources on fulfilling what it expects your preferences probably were. If your preferences mandate you being alive, then it will do so, but I suspect that most humans upon much reflection and moral evolution won't care as much about their specific existence.' Anna Salamon and I think Eliezer suspect that personal identity is closer to human-ness than e.g. Steve Rayhawk and I do, for what it's worth.
An existential risk occurs before Will is cryopreserved. Signing up for cryonics doesn't work, but this possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
An existential risk occurs after Will is cryopreserved. Signing up for cryonics doesn't work, but this possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
Option 2: Will does not sign up for cryonics.
uFAI is developed before Will dies. This situation is irrelevant to our decision theory.
uFAI is developed after Will dies. This situation is irrelevant to our decision theory.
FAI is developed before Will dies. This situation is irrelevant to our decision theory.
FAI is developed after Will dies. Because Will was not cryopreserved the FAI does not revive him in the typical sense. However, perhaps it can faithfully restore Will's brain-state from recordings of Will in the minds of humanity anyway, if that's what humanity would want. Alternatively Will is revived in ancestor simulations done by the FAI or any other FAI that is curious about humanity's history around the time right before its singularity. Measure is really important here, so I'm confused. I suspect less but not orders of magnitude less than the 50% figure above? This is an important point.
An existential risk occurs and Will dies. This possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
An existential risk occurs and Will dies. This possibility has no significantness in our decision theory anyway.
Basically, the point is that the most important factor by far is what an FAI does after going FOOM, and we don't really know what's going to happen there. So cryonics becomes a matter of preference more than a matter of probability. But if you're thinking about worlds that our decision theory discounts, e.g. where a uFAI is developed or rogue MNT is developed, then the probability of being revived drops a lot.
Well, that gets tricky, because I have weak subjective evidence that I can't share with anyone else, and really odd ideas about it, that makes me think that an FAI is the likely outcome. (Basically, I suspect something sorta kinda a little along the lines of me living in a fun theory universe. Or more precisely, I am a sub-computation of a longer computation that is optimized for fun, so that even though my life is sub-optimal at the moment I expect it to get a lot better in the future, and that the average of the whole computation's fun will turned out to be argmaxed. Any my life right now rocks pretty hard anyway. I suspect other people have weaker versions of this [with different evidence from mine] with correspondingly weaker probability estimates for this kind of thing happening.) So if we assume with p=1 that a positive singularity will occur for sake of ease, that leaves about 2% that cryonics will work (5% that an FAI raises the cryonic dead minus 3% that an FAI raises all the dead) if you die times the probability that you die before the singularity (about 15% for most people [but about 2% for me]) which leads to 0.3% as my figure for someone with a sense of identity far stronger than me, Kaj, and many others, who would adjust downward from there (an FAI can be expected to extrapolate our minds and discover it should use the resources on making 10 people with values similar to ourself instead, or something). If you say something like 5% positive singularity instead, then it comes out to 0.015%, or very roughly 1 in 7000 (although of course your decision theory should discount worlds in which you die no matter what anyway, so that the probability of actually living past the singularity shouldn't change your decision to sign up all that much). I suspect someone with different intuitions would give a very different answer, but it'll be hard to make headway in debate because it really is so non-technical. The reason I give extremely low probabilities for myself is due to considerations that apply to me only and that I'd rather not go into.
Hmm... Seems like crazy talk to me. It's your mind, tread softly.
I am reasonably confident that no such process can produce an entity that I would identify as myself. Being reconstructed from other peoples' memories means losing the memories of all inner thoughts, all times spent alone, and all times spent with people who have died or forgotten the occasion. That's too much lost for any sort of continuity of consciousness.
Hm, well we can debate the magic powers a superintelligence possesses (whether or not it can raise the dead), but I think this would make Eliezer sad. I for one am not reasonably confident either way. I am not willing to put bounds on an entity that I am not sure won't get access to an infinite amount of computation in finite time. At any rate, it seems we have different boundaries around identity. I'm having trouble removing the confusion about identity from my calculations.