The consequentialist model of blame is very different from the deontological model. Because all actions are biologically determined, none are more or less metaphysically blameworthy than others, and none can mark anyone with the metaphysical status of "bad person" and make them "deserve" bad treatment. Consequentialists don't on a primary level want anyone to be treated badly, full stop; thus is it written: "Saddam Hussein doesn't deserve so much as a stubbed toe." But if consequentialists don't believe in punishment for its own sake, they do believe in punishment for the sake of, well, consequences. Hurting bank robbers may not be a good in and of itself, but it will prevent banks from being robbed in the future. And, one might infer, although alcoholics may not deserve condemnation, societal condemnation of alcoholics makes alcoholism a less attractive option.

This reminds me of my personal philosophy of crime. The only reason to punish people for a crime would be if it a) set an example (to society and to the person) or b) kept them from commiting the crime or a similiar one again as they can't when their in jail or dead. The only problem with this is that it works in reverse. We could put people who haven't commited a crime in jail on the grounds that they are likely to or it helps society when their in jail.