Vladimir_Nesov comments on Diseased thinking: dissolving questions about disease - Less Wrong

236 Post author: Yvain 30 May 2010 09:16PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 13 June 2010 11:55:59AM 0 points [-]

"what would happen if I added a glider here to this frame of a Conway's Life game?" has a defined answer, even though no such glider will be present in the original world.

Why would you be interested in something that can't occur in the real world?

Comment author: RobinZ 13 June 2010 12:07:57PM 2 points [-]

In the "free will" case? Because I want the most favorable option to be factual, and in order to prove that, I need to be able to deduce the consequences of the unfavorable options.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 13 June 2010 12:19:42PM *  3 points [-]

In the "free will" case?

What?

Because I want the most favorable option to be factual, and in order to prove that, I need to be able to deduce the consequences of the unfavorable options.

Not prove, implement. You are not rationalizing the best option as being the actual one, you are making it so. When you consider all those options, you don't know which ones of them are contrary to fact, and which ones are not. You never consider something you know to be counter-factual.

Comment author: RobinZ 13 June 2010 12:25:27PM 0 points [-]

Yes, that's a much better phrasing than mine.

(p.s. you realize that I am having an argument with Ganapati about the compatibility of determinism and free will in this thread, right?)

Comment author: Ganapati 13 June 2010 02:49:34PM -2 points [-]

Actually you brought in the counterfactual argument to attempt to explain the significance (or "purpose") of an approach called consequentialism (as opposed to others) in a determined universe.

Comment author: RobinZ 13 June 2010 03:44:16PM 2 points [-]
Comment author: Ganapati 13 June 2010 04:42:01PM 0 points [-]

You brought up the counterfactualism example right here, so I assumed it was in response to that post.

Comment author: RobinZ 13 June 2010 05:29:21PM 0 points [-]

I'm sorry, do you have an objection to the reading of "counterfactual" elaborated in this thread?

Comment author: Ganapati 17 June 2010 06:35:31AM -1 points [-]

Sorry for the delay in replying. No, I don't have any objection to the reading of the counterfactual. However I fail to connect it to the question I posed.

In a determined universe, the future is completely determined whether any conscious entity in it can predict it or not. No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it.

Determinism, like solipsism, is a logically consistent system of belief. It cannot be proven wrong anymore than solpsism can be, since the only "evidence" disproving it, if any, lies with the entity believing it, not outside.

Do you feel that you are a purposeless entity whose actions and beliefs have no significance whatsoever on the future? If so, your feelings are very much consistent with your belief in determinism. If not, it may be time to take into consideration the evidence in the form of your feelings.

Thank you all for your time!

Comment author: RobinZ 18 June 2010 05:30:52PM 5 points [-]

In a determined universe, the future is completely determined whether any conscious entity in it can predict it or not. No actions, considerations, beliefs of any entity have any more significance on the future than those of another simply because they cannot alter it. [emphasis added]

Wrong. If Alice orders the fettucini in world A, she gets fettucini, but if Alice' orders eggplant in world A, she gets eggplant. The future is not fixed in advance - it is a function of the present, and your acts in the present create the future.

There's an old Nozick quote that I found in Daniel Dennett's Elbow Room: "No one has ever announced that because determinism is true thermostats do not control temperature." Our actions and beliefs have exactly the sameĀ ontological significance as the switching and setting of the thermostat. Tell me in what sense a thermostat does not control the temperature.