Open Thread June 2010, Part 2

komponisto

I agree with most of that. There is nothing irrational about wanting to pass on your genes, or valuing the welfare of people whose genes you partially chose. There is nothing irrational about not wanting that stuff, either.

just because people's intuitions may not point directly at some deeper moral truth doesn't mean that there is no moral truth, still less that the one and only moral truth is consequentialism.

I want to use the language of moral anti-realism so that it's clear that I can justify my values without saying that yours are wrong. I've already explained why my values make sense to me. Do they make sense to you?

I think we both agree that a personal father-child relationship is a sufficient basis for filial love. I also think that for you, having a say in a child's genome is also enough to make you feel filial love. It is not so for me.

Out of curiosity: Suppose you marry someone and want to wait a few years before having a baby; and then your spouse covertly acquires a copy of your genome, recombines it with their own, and makes a baby. Would that child be yours?

Suppose you and your spouse agree on a genome for your child, and then your spouse covertly makes a few adjustments. Would you have less filial love for that child?

Suppose a random person finds a file named "MyIdealChild'sGenome.dna" on your computer and uses it to make a child. Would that child be yours?

Suppose you have a baby the old-fashioned way, but it turns out you'd been previously infected with a genetically-engineered virus that replaced the DNA in your germ line cells, so that your child doesn't actually have any of your DNA. Would that child be yours?

In these cases, my feelings for the child would not depend on the child's genome, and I am okay with that. I'm guessing your feelings work differently.

As for the moral arguments: In case it wasn't clear, I'm not arguing that you need to keep a week-old baby that isn't genetically related to you. Indeed, when you have a baby, you are making a tacit commitment of the form "I will care for this child, conditional on the child being my biological progeny." You think it's okay to reject an illegitimate baby, because it's not "yours"; I think it's okay to reject it, because it's not covered by your precommitment.

We also agree that it's not okay to reject a three-year-old illegitimate child — you, because you'd be "attached" to them; and me, because we've formed a personal bond that makes the child emotionally dependent on me.

Edit: formatting.

Nisan16y40

Mass_Driver16y00

I want to use the language of moral anti-realism so that it's clear that I can justify my values without saying that yours are wrong.

That's thoughtful, but, from my point of view, unnecessary. I am an ontological moral realist but an epistemological moral skeptic; just because there is such a thing as "the right thing to do" doesn't mean that you or I can know with certainty what that thing is. I can hear your justifications for your point of view without feeling threatened; I only want to believe that X is good if X is actually good.

I've

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0Blueberry16y

I'm pretty sure I'd have no problem rejecting such a child, at least in the specific situation where I was misled into thinking it was mine. This discussion started by talking about a couple who had agreed to be monogamous, and where the wife had cheated on the husband and gotten pregnant by another man. You don't seem to be considering the effect of the deceit and lies perpetuated by the mother in this scenario. It's very different than, say, adoption, or genetic engineering, or if the couple had agreed to have a non-monogamous relationship. I suspect most of the rejection and negative feelings toward the illegitimate child wouldn't be because of genetics, but because of the deception involved.

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Open Thread June 2010, Part 2

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Open Thread June 2010, Part 2

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