You'd need to spell out more precisely what [Gene Callahan]'s doing that you think deserves criticism.

Exactly what I referred to in the previous paragraph.

it's [up to] those who are aware of the classics' insights to understand and present them where applicable.

Callahan is, supposedly, aware of these classics' insights. Did he present them where applicable? Show evidence he understands them? No. Every time he drops the name of a great author or a classic, he fails to put the argument in his own words, sketch it out, or show its applicability to the arguments under discussion.

For example, he drops the remark that "Polanyi showed that crystallography is an a priori science [in the sense that Austrian economics is]" as if it were conclusively settled. Then, when I explain why this can't possibly be the case, Callahan is unable to provide any further elaboration of why that is (and I couldn't find a reference to it anywhere).

The problem, I contend, is therefore on his end. To the extent that Callahan's list of classics is relevant, and that he is a majestic bearer of this deep, hard-won knowledge, he is unable to actually show how the classics are relevant, and what amazing arguments are presented in them that obviate our discussion. The duty falls on him to make them relevant, not for everyone else to just go out and read everything he has, just because he thinks, in all his gullible wisdom, that it will totally convince us.

Note: I wasn't alone in noticing Callahan's refusal to engage. Another poster remarked:

Gene, The problems with appeals to authority are, 1) as you point out, not everyone may be familiar with the work of the authority, 2) the ‘authority’ may actually not be one (see Silas’ comments on crystallography), and 3) it’s a substitute for actually making an argument. It’s easy, and pointless, to simply say ‘other people have shown you’re wrong’. But if you present an argument then we can discuss it’s merits and flaws. ...

See, that’s how discussion works. If you have a position, just explain it! Then we can talk about it.

With regard to the books you mention: what little I have read about them, they aren't impressive or promising. For example, Feyerabend seems to think he has some great insight that good scientific theories don't have to incorporate the old theory, but rather, the normally make progress by ignoring the old. But he's attacking a strawman: new theories aren't expected to incorporate the old theory, just to be able to make the same predictions. [EDIT: Sorry, original version didn't have the complete sentence.]

Also, people like to make a big deal about how clever Quine's holism argument is, but if you're at all familiar with Bayesianism, you roll your eyes at it. Yes, theories can't be tested in isolation, but Bayesian inference can tell you which beliefs are most strongly weakened by which evidence, showing that you have a basis for saying which theory was, in effect, tested by the observations.

Things like these make me skeptical of those who claim that these philosophers have something worthwhile to say to me about science. I would rather focus on reading the epistemology of those who are actually making real, unfakeable, un-groupthinkable progress, like Sebastian Thrun and Judea Pearl.