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Will_Newsome comments on MWI, copies and probability - Less Wrong
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Comments (127)
To loosely paraphrase Charles Babbage: 'I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such an argument.' I don't believe Eliezer was thinking very clearly when he wrote that post.
I agree. That is the one post of Eliezer's that I can think of that seems to be just confused (when he probably didn't need to be).
Can you share your way of "disconfusion"?
I've made a copy of myself. After that I will find myself either as an original, or as a copy, but both these subjective states will correspond to one physical state. It seems there is something beyond physical state.
I have an idea I've already partially described in other posts, that allows me to remain reductionist. But I wonder how others deal with that.
Edit: Physical state refers to physical state of world, not to the physical state of particular copy.
Er, aren't those the same subjective state as well?
Original-I will see that I still stand/lie on scanner end of copying apparatus. Copy-I will see that I "teleported" to construction chamber of copying apparatus. One's current experiences is a part of subjective state, isn't it?
If scanner and construction chambers are identical, then my subjective state "splits" when Original-I and Copy-I leave chamber (note that "in-chamber" states are one subjective state).
Edit: I've added minor clarification.
These different subjective states correspond to different physical states: different patterns of photons impinge on your retinas, causing different neural activity in your visual cortex, and so forth.
I've left space for misinterpretation in my root post. I meant world physical state, not a state of particular copy. World state: original-body exists and copy-body exists. Subjective state: either I am original, or I am copy.
As far as I can see both those subjective states exist simultaneously, it's not an "either or".
You-before-copying wakes up as both original-you and copy-you after the copying. From there the subjective states diverge. Analogously, in the grenade example before-grenade you continues as both dead-you* and you-with-$100**
*(who doesn't experience anything, unless there's an afterlife)
**(as well as all other possible quantum-yous. But that's another issue entirely)
I suspect I'm rather missing the point. What point are you in fact trying to make if I may ask?
Yes, both subjective states exist. It is not the point.
You wake up after copying, at what point should you experience being both copy and original?
Before you open your eyes, you can't know if you copy or original, but it is not experience of being both, because physical states of both brains at this point are identical to state of brain that wasn't copied at all. After you open your eyes you will find youself being either copy or original, but again not both by obvious reason.
It is not true if subjective experience isn't ontologically fundamental. As existense of e.g. paricular kind of Boltzmann brain seem in that case sufficient for continuation of subjective experience (very unpleasant experience in this case).
Again, what point are you actually trying to make here?
A continuation of subjective experience after death is an afterlife.
This has nothing to do with 'splitting' per se. If your point was valid then you could make it equally well by saying:
A and B are different people in the same universe. World state: "A exists and B exists". Subjective state: "Either A is thinking or B is thinking." Same physical state, different subjective states. Therefore, "it seems there is something beyond the physical state".
But this 'either or' business is nonsense. A and B are both thinking. You and copy are both thinking. What's the big deal?
(Apparently, you think the universe is something like in the film Aliens where in addition to whatever's actually happening, there is a "bank of screens" somewhere showing everyone's points of view. And then after you split, "your screen" must either show the original's point of view or else it must show the copy's.)
If you're saying that you don't have subjective experiences, I'll bite the bullet, and will not trust your view on the matter. However I doubt that you want me to think so. What is subjective experience or "one's screen", as you put it, to you?
Of course we have subjective experience: it's just that both copies of you have it, and there is no special flame of consciousness that goes to one but not the other. After the copy, both copies remember being the original. They're both "you".
Right now, definitely not. That would involve re-immersing myself in the issue, reviewing several post threads of comments and recreating all those thoughts that my brain oh so thoughtfully chose to not maintain in memory in the absence of sufficient repitition. If I had made my post back then, taken the extra steps of putting words to an explanation that would be comprehensible to others, then I would most likely not have lost those thoughts. (Note to self....)
Sorry? Does it mean that we can assign probabilities to future experiences? Or does it mean that we can't do it, but nevertheless we shouldn't expect being Boltzmann brain in 5 seconds?