Matt_Simpson comments on So You Think You're a Bayesian? The Natural Mode of Probabilistic Reasoning - Less Wrong

48 Post author: Matt_Simpson 14 July 2010 04:51PM

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Comment author: AnlamK 15 July 2010 02:49:53AM *  1 point [-]

Well, to clarify, here's an example from here :

To illustrate, in a study conduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a random number was generated by spinning a wheel. Participants were then asked to specify whether this random number was higher or lower than was the percentage of nations that are located in Africa--referred to as a comparative question. Finally, participants were instructed to estimate the percentage of nations that are located in Africa-an absolute question. Participants who had received a high random number were more inclined to overestimate the percentage of nations that are located in Africa. The anchor, as represented by the random number, biased their final estimate.

Here, the biased thinking isn't a result of thinking in terms of abstract probabilities as opposed to concrete frequencies.

I'm sympathetic to the points G makes. It's just that K&T's results don't always depend on information presented as probabilities.

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 15 July 2010 04:14:52AM *  2 points [-]

But that example is probabilities. Here's how I would redesign the experiment to make the subjects think in frequencies:

  • Generate a random integer from 0 to the number of countries in the world
  • Ask subjects whether this number is higher or lower than the number in Africa
  • Ask subjects to estimate the number of nations that are in Africa
  • sub treatments: either tell subjects the total number of nations in the world or don't.