SarahC:
But what Shalizi showed is that you can generate the same correlations if you let test scores depend on three thousand uncorrelated abilities. You can get the same results as the IQ advocates even when absolutely no single factor determines different abilities.
Just to be clear, this is not an original idea by Shalizi, but the well known "sampling theory" of general intelligence first proposed by Godfrey Thomson almost a century ago. Shalizi states this very clearly in the post, and credits Thomson with the idea. However, for whatever reason, he fails to mention the very extensive discussions of this theory in the existing literature, and writes as if Thomson's theory had been ignored ever since, which definitely doesn't represent the actual situation accurately.
In a recent paper by van der Maas et al., which presents an extremely interesting novel theory of correlations that give rise to g (and which Shalizi links to at one point), the authors write:
Thorndike (1927) and Thomson (1951) proposed one such alternative mechanism, namely, sampling. In this sampling theory, carrying out cognitive tasks requires the use of many lower order uncorrelated modules or neural processes (so-called bonds). They hypothesized that the samples of modules or bonds used for different cognitive tests partly overlap, causing a positive correlation between the test scores. In this view, the positive manifold is due to a measurement problem in the sense that it is very difficult to obtain independent measures of the lower order processes. Jensen (1998) and Eysenck (1987) identified three problems with this sampling theory. First, whereas some complex mental tests, as predicted by sampling theory, highly load on the g factor, some very narrowly defined tests also display high g loadings. Second, some seemingly completely unrelated tests, such as visual and memory scan tasks, are consistently highly correlated, whereas related tests, such as forward and backward digit span, are only modestly correlated. Third, in some cases brain damage leads to very specific impairments, whereas sampling theory predicts general impairments. These three facts are difficult to explain with sampling theory, which as a consequence has not gained much acceptance.1 Thus, the g explanation remains very dominant in the current literature (see Jensen, 1998, p. 107).
Note that I take no position here about whether these criticisms of the sampling theory are correct or not. However, I think this quote clearly demonstrates that an attempt to write off g by merely invoking the sampling theory is not a constructive contribution to the discussion.
I would also add that if someone managed to construct multiple tests of mental ability that would sample disjoint sets of Thomsonesque underlying abilities and thus fail to give rise to g, it would be considered a tremendous breakthrough. Yet, despite the strong incentive to achieve this, nobody who has tried so far has succeeded. This evidence is far from conclusive, but far from insignificant either.
I think Shalizi isn't too far off the mark in writing "as if Thomson's theory had been ignored". Although a few psychologists & psychometricians have acknowledged Thomson's sampling model, in everyday practice it's generally ignored. There are far more papers out there that fit g-oriented factor models as a matter of course than those that try to fit a Thomson-style model. Admittedly, there is a very good reason for that — Thomson-style models would be massively underspecified on the datasets available to psychologists, so it's not practical ...
This thread is for the discussion of Less Wrong topics that have not appeared in recent posts. If a discussion gets unwieldy, celebrate by turning it into a top-level post.
Part 2