I wouldn't feel comfortable making that claim until I'd tested it on a couple of non-human agents, and in any case I wouldn't call it mysterious.

Really all I have is the suspicion that consciousness is much more normal than people tend to think. The only thing I'm confident of is that explaining consciousness won't require magic or special exceptions to the laws of physics.

The problem is that most philosophers who care about phenomenology at all would assign at least some ontologically foundational status to subjective experience, simply because it is foundational enough to you and anyone else with subjective experience.

Unfortunately, this is close to nonsense. Just because something strikes me as foundational to me doesn't give me any decent reason for thinking it has any such actually foundational status. Humans suck as introspection. We really, really suck at intuiting out the differences in how we process things unless things are going drastically wrong. For example, it isn't obvious to most humans that we use different sections of our brains to add and multiply. But, there's a lot of evidence for this. For example, fMRI scans show different areas lighting up, with areas corresponding to memory lighting up for multiplication and areas corresponding to reasoning lighting up for addition. Similarly, there are stroke victims who only lose the ability to do one or the other operation. And this is but one example of how humans fail. Relying on human feelings to get an idea about how anything in the world, especially our own mind, works is not a good idea.

It does mean that Occam's razor should apply to "the way it feels from the inside", which tends to weigh against complex explanations like "configurations of neurons" and in favor of either exotic physics or a spooky superintelligence who can figure out how to run debugger sessions on our physical brains.

I don't follow this logic at all. I'm not completely sure what you are trying to do here but it sounds suspiciously like the theistic argument that God is a simple hypothesis. Just because I can posit something as a single, irreducible entity does not make that thing simple. (Also, can you expand on what you mean by a spooky superintelligence running debugging sessions since I can't parse this is in any coherent way)

There is a reasonable argument to be made that "the way it feels from the inside" is just as fundamental as the basic physics of how the world works.

Well, what is it, then?

The problem is that most philosophers who care about phenomenology at all would assign at least some ontologically foundational status to subjective experience, simply because it is foundational enough to you and anyone else with subjective experience.

Ahhhh, I see now. Subjective experience must be ontologically foundational because it feels foundational, subjectively. This seems oddly... circular.

It does mean that Occam's razor should apply to "the way it feels from the inside", which tends to weigh against complex explanations like "configurations of neurons" and in favor of either exotic physics or a spooky superintelligence who can figure out how to run debugger sessions on our physical brains.

Configurations of neurons are not complex. They are complicated, but they can still be explained by the same physics as everything else in the world. You are proposing a more complex universe. Or possibly a god. They are equally implausible without supporting evidence.