Wei_Dai comments on Metaphilosophical Mysteries - Less Wrong

35 Post author: Wei_Dai 27 July 2010 12:55AM

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Comment author: Wei_Dai 28 July 2010 08:15:24AM *  1 point [-]

So the question is not "why don't we have any self-shadowing blind-spots", it is "why do we have a nontrivial set of non-self-shadowing blind spots?"

Agreed, but I think it's also, "why do we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect, given what we know about how evolution works?"

And while you're right that we can't be sure at this point that we have zero self-shadowing blind-spots (philosophical oversights that we'll never detect), I think there's a reasonable chance that's in fact the case. ETA: My argument for this belief is that one possible reason why we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect is that there is a single "ability to philosophize" that is sufficient (given enough raw intelligence) to overcome all such blind spots.

Comment author: Yvain 28 July 2010 08:18:13PM 3 points [-]

The opposite explanation also works: we use so many unrelated heuristics that there's no single area where they all fail simultaneously.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 03 August 2010 11:59:24PM 0 points [-]

If some of the heuristics are failing and some are succeeding, they are producing different results. Which process determines which results are correct? Should this be called "philosophical ability"?

(non-rhetorical questions)

Comment author: Yvain 05 August 2010 11:06:09PM 0 points [-]

It doesn't necessarily have to be cenralized. Some heuristics could have different weights than others, and stronger ones win out. Or there could be a reflective equilibrium among them.

...not that there's any evidence for any of this.