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saturn comments on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 2 - Less Wrong
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Only if you try to act honorably to the honorable and dishonorably to the dishonorable do you have something like TDT.
And you must do this in a way that makes you appear honorable to others who use the same algorithm.
Reputation effects are one way to change the payoffs so it's no longer a Prisoner's Dilemma. But if this particular interaction is more important than the reputation effects, TDT still defects against an honorable paperclipper who isn't TDT or higher.
TDT says: I cooperate iff (you will cooperate iff I cooperate).
Honorable says: I cooperate iff you will cooperate.
It seems to me that, although Honorable is suboptimal if it meets an unconditional cooperator, TDT will cooperate with it because it meets the condition that TDT cares about.
On reflection, your conclusion is obviously right: playing PD against Honorbot is simply playing Newcomb's Dilemma, so TDT cooperates.
I was misled by the recent realization that TDT doesn't actually work out to "I cooperate iff (you will cooperate iff I cooperate)".