Drescher has some important things to say about this distinction in Good and Real. What I got out of it, is that the CI is justifiable on consequentialist or self-serving grounds, so long as you relax the constraint that you can only consider the causal consequences (or "means-end links") of your decisions, i.e., things that happen "futureward" of your decision.

Drescher argues that specifically ethical behavior is distinguished by its recognition of these "acausal means-end links", in which you act for the sake of what would be the case if-counterfactually you would make that decision, even though you may already know the result. (Though I may be butchering it -- it's tough to get my head around the arguments.)

And I saw a parallel between Drescher's reasoning and UDT, as the former argues that your decisions set the output of all similar processes to the extent that they are similar.