If you are precisely wrong, it will be easy for evidence to refute you and make you less wrong.
This seems to imply that we should delegate decision-making to a system that is certain the sky is rgb(0,255,0) over a system that assigns the bulk of its probability to various shades of blue. But, if we know that the sky really is some shade of blue, the system with the less precise prior that the sky is blue will do better than the system that precisely thinks it's (bright lime!) green as new evidence becomes available.
I can't imagine that this is actually what's meant by the original quote or your reply. What is D'Arcy Thompson's view?
Here's some context for D'Arcy Thompson:
...As soon as we adventure on the paths of the physicist, we learn to weigh and to measure, to deal with time and space and mass and their related concepts, and to find more and more our knowledge expressed and our needs satisfied through the concept of number, as in the dreams and visions of Plato and Pythagoras; for modem chemistry would have gladdened the hearts of those great philosophic dreamers. Dreams apart, numerical precision is the very soul of science, and its attainment affords the best, perhaps the only c
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