Interesting theory.

• I tend to agree with Tim Tyler that the "common" interpretation of consciousness is simpler and the signaling thing is not necessary. I realize that you are trying to increase the scope of the theory, but I am not convinced yet that the cure is better than the illness.

• While I could see why an ape trying to break into "polite society" might want to gain the facility you describe, the apes created the "polite society" in the first place, I do not see a plausible solution to the catch 22 (perhaps it's a lack of imagination).

• You raise the question of U not being able to be a complete hypocrite, therefore "inventing" C, who is good at lying to itself. But wouldn't others notice that C is lying to itself, and remains largely a hypocrite? If the achievement of C is being more cooperative, why doesn't U just skip the BS and become more cooperative? (I actually think this last point might be answerable, the key observation being that C operates on a logical, verbal level. This allows it to be predictably consistent if certain specific situations, such as "if friend do this", which is very important in solving the kinds of game-theoretic scenarios you describe. Giving cooperation over to C, rather than "making U more cooperative" creates consistency, which is essential. I think you might have hinted at this.)

ETA: the theory might be more palatable if the issues of consciousness and "public relation function" are separated along byrnema's lines (but perhaps clearer).