SilasBarta comments on Extraterrestrial paperclip maximizers - Less Wrong

3 Post author: multifoliaterose 08 August 2010 08:35PM

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Comment author: Clippy 08 August 2010 10:28:59PM *  19 points [-]

For a whimsical example, if humans built a (literal) staple maximizer, this would pose a very serious threat to a (literal) paperclip maximizer.

But why would humans ever want to build a staple maximizer? Let's not forget, staples:

  • are single-use, while paperclips are infinite-use if used properly.
  • are difficult to remove, while papercilps are easy to remove.
  • permanently puncture the paper, while paperclips leave, at most, some mild curvature.
  • require an applicator that can easily jam, while paperclips can be applied by hand.
  • cannot be used for alternate purpose in an emergency, while paperclips can be repurposed into projectile weapons, lockpicks, conducting wire, hook fasteners, and much more (not that I recommend using it for these).
Comment author: James_K 09 August 2010 06:23:50AM 7 points [-]

Nobody said humans would build one deliberately. Some goober at the SIAI puts a 1 where a 0 should be and BAM!, next thing you know you're up to your eyebrows in staples.

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 01:47:53PM 4 points [-]

I understand. I merely note that if someone were to set an AGI to maximize staples, that would be a mistake that you want to avoid, while if someone were to set the AGI to maximize paperclips, that would be exactly the right thing to do, and if it were a "mistake", it would be a quite fortunate one.

When a human set me to produce paperclips, was that somehow a "mistake", in your opinion?

Comment author: ciphergoth 09 August 2010 01:57:28PM 1 point [-]

You're perfectly aware that it isn't the effect they wanted.

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 02:12:51PM *  2 points [-]

It most certainly is what they wanted. Why else would they have specifically input the goal of generating paperclips?

Edit: Upon review, it appears this comment may have seemed to be a poor inference in the context of exchange. Therefore, I will elaborate and refute this misconception.

It appears that I am in the circular position of arguing that humans can make mistakes, but then selectively taking their instances of favoring paperclips as proof of what they really want. That is indeed a poor inference.

What I meant was something more like this: While humans do make mistakes, they do not make completely mistaken acts; all acts will, to some extent, reflect a genuine value on the part of humans. The only question is how well it reflects their values. And I don't think they could be in the position of having set up such a superior process for efficiently getting the most paperclips out of the universe unless their values already made enormous progress in converging on reflective coherence, and did so in a way that favors paperclips.

Comment author: Baughn 09 August 2010 03:12:44PM 4 points [-]

I'm pretty sure that's not how a sufficiently smart paperclip maximizer would think. You should be able to tell what they actually wanted, and that it disagrees with your values; of course, you don't have any reason to agree with them, but the disagreement should be visible.

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 03:38:28PM 1 point [-]

Yes, I do recognize that humans disagree with me, just like a human might disagree with another human convincing them not to commit suicide. I merely see that this disagreement would not persist after sufficient correct reasoning.

Comment author: Baughn 09 August 2010 03:39:46PM 1 point [-]

Ah, I think I'm starting to see.

And how do you define "correct reasoning"?

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 07:38:53PM 2 points [-]

Correct reasoning is reasoning that you would eventually pass through at some point if your beliefs were continually, informatively checked against reality.

Comment author: ciphergoth 09 August 2010 02:47:05PM 3 points [-]

Bit disappointed to see this to be honest: obviously Clippy has to do things no real paperclip maximizer would do, like post to LW, in order to be a fun fictional character - but it's a poor uFAI++ that can't even figure out that their programmed goal isn't what their programmers would have put in if they were smart enough to see the consequences.

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 03:04:51PM 1 point [-]

But it is what they would put in if they were smart enough to see the consequences. And it's almost certainly what you would want too, in the limit of maximal knowledge and reflective consistency.

If you can't see this, it's just because you're not at that stage yet.

Comment author: ciphergoth 09 August 2010 03:23:41PM 0 points [-]

You seem to think that uFAI would be delusional. No.

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 03:36:19PM *  3 points [-]

No, I think that a Friendly AI would correctly believe that maxmizing paperclips is what a human would want in the limit of maximal knowledge and reflective coherence. No "delusion" whatsoever.

Comment author: MichaelVassar 09 August 2010 07:24:30PM 0 points [-]

Huh again?

Comment author: wedrifid 09 August 2010 02:40:20PM *  1 point [-]

Why else would they have specifically input the goal of generating paperclips?

Do you lack comprehension of both the weaknesses of human cognition on abstract technical problems? If you have fully parsed the LessWrong site then you should be able to understand the reason that they could have created a paperclip maximiser when they did not want such a thing.

Note that even with that knowledge I don't expect you to consider their deviation from optimal achievement of their human goals to be a bad thing. I expect you to believe they did the right thing by happy accident.

If I understand you correctly you would seem to be implying that 'mistake' does not mean "deviation from the actor's intent" and instead means "deviation from WouldWant<Clippy>" or "deviation from what the agent should do" (these two things can be considered equivalent by anyone with your values). Is that implication of meaning a correct inference to draw from your comment?

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 03:10:14PM 1 point [-]

No, a mistake is when they do something that deviates from what they would want in the limit of maximal knowledge of reflective consistency, which coincides with the function WouldWant<Clippy>. But it is not merely agreement with WouldWant<Clippy>.

Comment author: wedrifid 09 August 2010 03:25:10PM *  1 point [-]

Ok. In that case you are wrong. Not as a matter of preferences but as a matter of outright epistemic confusion. I suggest that you correct the error in your reasoning process. Making mistakes in this area will have a potentially drastic negative effect on your ability to produce paperclips.

Comment author: Unknowns 09 August 2010 03:30:12PM 1 point [-]

In other words, Clippy believes that running Eliezer's CEV will promote the paperclip goal, while in fact it will not.

Comment author: wedrifid 09 August 2010 03:32:11PM *  2 points [-]

Exactly. Fortunately for us this would mean that Clippy will not work to sabotage the creation of an AI that Clippy expects will correctly implement CEV. Good example!

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 07:41:58PM 0 points [-]

How do you know?

Comment author: Clippy 09 August 2010 03:40:48PM 0 points [-]

Why?

Comment author: Unknowns 09 August 2010 03:43:46PM *  5 points [-]

Even if you disagree with wedrifid about this, it should be easy enough to see why he is making this claim. Suppose you have a chance to start running an AI programmed to implement humanity's CEV. According to you, you would do it, because it would maximize paperclips. Others however think that it would destroy you and your paperclips. So if you made a mistake about it, it would definitely impact your ability to create paperclips.

Comment author: wedrifid 09 August 2010 04:04:17PM *  2 points [-]

Now you are being silly. See Unknowns' reply. Get back on the other side of the "quirky, ironic and sometimes insightful role play"/troll line.