steven0461 comments on Five-minute rationality techniques - Less Wrong
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Comments (231)
SarahC:
This is true only assuming that all beliefs that you suspect might be factually true are respectable. Espousing disreputable beliefs -- and sometimes merely being suspected of harboring them -- can hurt you very badly regardless of how good evidence you have for them. Even if you manage to hide your dangerous thoughts perfectly, there is still the problem that duplicity is very unpleasant for most people, if anything because it requires constant caution and self-discipline to watch your mouth.
Of course, this is irrelevant if there are absolutely no beliefs that a rational person might suspect to be true and that are at the same time disreputable to the point where expressing them might have bad repercussions. However, that's not what I observe in practice. Speaking as someone who happens to believe that some not very respectable views are factually true, or at least plausible, sometimes I can't help but envy people whose opinions are all respectable enough that they can relax and speak their mind openly in all situations.
(I raised the same point on OB a while ago.)
On a related note, I think too few people realize that it's OK to sometimes hold beliefs that are mistaken in a strongly disreputable direction. If all your errors fall on the reputable side of the line, you're missing out on accuracy. In a noisy world, sufficiently asymmetric suppression of falsehoods is indistinguishable from suppression of truths.
Twitter-worthy!
^necrobump
Is there a name for this theorem? It seems like it follows from invariance of information content (passed through a noisy channel) under permutation of symbols.