Saladin comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2010-2011) - Less Wrong

42 Post author: orthonormal 12 August 2010 01:08AM

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Comment author: Saladin 13 August 2010 07:27:41PM *  0 points [-]

I'm quite sure i'm not ready for such a discussion. I don't have the education and the critical/analytic approach needed to state complex sets of axioms, to give formulaic approaches, to adapt physical theories etc. My sloppy english and writing in overly simplified terms doesn't help much either.

But I think I know the laymans basics of the main physical theories and I have a general idea where the main problems lie.

Ignoring the problems, loopholes, paradoxes,... while good for solving localized problems and questions, is not good practice and science, if it doen't give a big, coherent picture of things (the result being, for example, the Copenhagen explanation).

Lets start out simple:

Is it logically true, that by any known logic and in accordance with known physics a past eternal Existence (which is and/or includes our universe) requires the use of modal logic and it's realisation as a type of modal realism?

Meaning: a past eternal Existence "must" include the realisation of all its pysical/logical possibilities (at minimum all the possibiities our universe physically/logically allows for)?

Is this correct?

Comment author: Emile 13 August 2010 07:38:46PM *  5 points [-]

No, it isn't.

Infinite time doesn't mean that everything physically possible happened. Maybe the same things kept happening over and over.

Comment author: Saladin 13 August 2010 09:14:10PM *  -1 points [-]

Doesn't quantum indeterminism (edit: quantum uncertanty) prevent that?

Any kind of quantum fluctuation, which "could" have had a makroscopic, relativistic effect must have had such an effect (f.e, in an early universe).

Either you except indeterminism or a nonlocal hidden variable - my guess is indeterminism is far more exceptable.

Comment author: prase 16 August 2010 01:25:52PM 6 points [-]

I would be far more careful using quantum physics in informal "philosophical" arguments. In most instances, people summon quantum effects to create a feeling of answered question, while in fact the answer is confused or, worse, not an asnwer at all. The general rule is: every philosophical argument using the word quantum is bogus. (Take with a grain of salt, of course.)

More concretely, closed quantum systems (i.e. when no measurement is done) evolve deterministically, and their evolution can be periodic.

Comment author: Saladin 21 August 2010 07:32:16AM 0 points [-]

I thought that in closed quantum system there are only probabilities of a true indeterminisitc nature - and the only deterministic part is at the collapse of the wave function (where the positions, speed,... are truly determined - but impossible to measure correctly).

Still the fact remains that one universe is holding observers and even there is only one sollution to past eternity - that of a cyclic universe of the same kind and same parameters of the big bang - the futures of the universe would be determined by the acts of those observers. Different acts of observing - different universes in series (but strictly with the same physical constants).

All the consequences of observing in those universes would so have to be realized.

Comment author: wnoise 21 August 2010 12:46:04PM *  0 points [-]

I thought that in closed quantum system there are only probabilities of a true indeterminisitc nature - and the only deterministic part is at the collapse of the wave function (where the positions, speed,... are truly determined - but impossible to measure correctly).

Mostly the opposite. In a closed quantum system, there are no probabilities, just the unitary, deterministic evolution of the wavefunction. On a measurement (which is a particular type of interaction with something outside the system), the collapse happens, and it is at this point that both probabilities and nondeterminism are both introduced. Whatever property is being observed sets an eigenbasis for the measurement. Each eigenspace is assigned a probability of being chosen proportional to the norm -- the sum of the square of the lengths. This probability is the probability that the wavefunction is replaced by the renormalized projection of that wavefunction into the chosen eigenspace.

(This is the simplest version -- it only covers von Neumann measurements in the Schrodinger picture applied to pure states.)

Comment author: timtyler 21 August 2010 01:11:52PM 0 points [-]

On a measurement (which is a particular type of interaction with something outside the system), the collapse happens, and it is at this point that both probabilities and nondeterminism are both introduced.

That's not very "MWI" of you! "Collapse" currently has the status of a fantasy which is unsupported by any evidence.

Comment author: PaulAlmond 21 August 2010 02:37:35PM *  1 point [-]

Agreed - MWI (many-worlds interpretation) does not have any "collapse": Instead parts of the wavefunction merely become decoherent with each other which might have the appearance of a collapse locally to observers. I know this is controversial, but I think the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of MWI because it is much more parsimonious than competing models in the sense that really matters - and the only sense in which the parsimony of a model could really be coherently described. (It is kind of funny that both sides of the MWI or !MWI debate tend to refer to parsimony.)

I find it somewhat strange that people who have problems with "all those huge numbers of worlds in MWI" don't have much of a problem with "all those huge numbers of stars and galaxies" in our conventional view of the cosmos - and it doesn't cause them to reach for a theory which has a more complicated basic description but gets rid of all that huge amount of stuff. When did any of us last meet anyone who claimed that "the backs of objects don't exist, except those being observed directly or indirectly by humans because it is more parsimonious not to have them there, even if you need a contrived theory to do away with them"? That’s the problem with arguing against MWI: To reduce the "amount of stuff in reality" - which never normally bothers us with theories, and shouldn't now, you have to introduce contrivance where it is really a bad idea - into the basic theory itself - by introducing some mechanism for "collapse".

Somehow, with all this, there is some kind of cognitive illusion going on. As I don't experience it, I can't identify with it and have no idea what it is.

Comment author: wnoise 22 August 2010 05:12:14AM 0 points [-]

Well, no, that language is not. But it's the standard language. Of all the interpretations, MWI makes the most sense to me, but quantum mechanics really is "merely" a very good effective model. (See the conflict between SR and QM. QFT neatly dodges some obstacles, but has even more horrendous interpretational issues. And we can only barely torture answers out of it in some limited cases in curved spacetime.)

Comment author: WrongBot 13 August 2010 10:50:05PM 1 point [-]

"Physical" and "logical" are not the same thing. Even if all physical possibilities are instantiated (as Tegmark's Level IV Multiverse implies, I believe), there are logical systems that do not describe any part of reality.

Comment author: Saladin 14 August 2010 08:29:37AM -2 points [-]

I always say "physical/logical" to note the known laws of physics of our universe and the logic that describes it.

If you say only "physical" - then you limit yourselve only to that which is directly observable, testable and foreseeable. And that hinders a more relaxed approach of discussing such "far-out" possibilities as required in such cases.

Point being: IMO the only valid physical/logical speculations are those that relate to the physics and logic we know of (or a variation of it in an indeterministic universe),

Only Past Eternity stays completely (or mostly) in such a physical/logical frame. Creatio Ex Nihilo is on the other hands, completely out of it with no hypothetical and (not to mention) no observational evidence offered.

It's the most unlogical thing ever conceived: no theory explains it - yet it has the "same" probability as any other option in the physically unknown.

If You "can" put the known logic and laws into the physically unknown and make it into a coherent, workable, testable theory - then any such theory is "more" probable then others without it.

Minimalism and reductionism, which are the the main reasons for allowing/prefering Creatio Ex Nihilo, break down after some scrutiny. If You talk about one singular event in all eternity (or non-existence), which just happens to be a universe capable of intelligent life - then you need to offer some theory - any kind of theory, that explains just that (and the logic of it). How can "Non-Existence" allow for any kind of Existence and why in all eternity just for 1?

If we talk multiple Creatio Ex nihilos for completely separated spatial/temporal universes, then their numbers can easilly exceed the nr. of universes that happened in a Eternal Existence.

Not just that - universes born out of Ex Nihilo would allow not just all possibilities as Eternal Existence allows for (based on known physical laws and logic) - it would also allow for universes with laws and logics completely unknown to us (illogical to us - just as Creatio Ex Nihilo is illogical to us).

So when You think about it Past Eternity is the simpler and more logical solution and as such a valid starting point for further specualtions.