Emile comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2010-2011) - Less Wrong
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No, it isn't.
Infinite time doesn't mean that everything physically possible happened. Maybe the same things kept happening over and over.
Doesn't quantum indeterminism (edit: quantum uncertanty) prevent that?
Any kind of quantum fluctuation, which "could" have had a makroscopic, relativistic effect must have had such an effect (f.e, in an early universe).
Either you except indeterminism or a nonlocal hidden variable - my guess is indeterminism is far more exceptable.
I would be far more careful using quantum physics in informal "philosophical" arguments. In most instances, people summon quantum effects to create a feeling of answered question, while in fact the answer is confused or, worse, not an asnwer at all. The general rule is: every philosophical argument using the word quantum is bogus. (Take with a grain of salt, of course.)
More concretely, closed quantum systems (i.e. when no measurement is done) evolve deterministically, and their evolution can be periodic.
I thought that in closed quantum system there are only probabilities of a true indeterminisitc nature - and the only deterministic part is at the collapse of the wave function (where the positions, speed,... are truly determined - but impossible to measure correctly).
Still the fact remains that one universe is holding observers and even there is only one sollution to past eternity - that of a cyclic universe of the same kind and same parameters of the big bang - the futures of the universe would be determined by the acts of those observers. Different acts of observing - different universes in series (but strictly with the same physical constants).
All the consequences of observing in those universes would so have to be realized.
Mostly the opposite. In a closed quantum system, there are no probabilities, just the unitary, deterministic evolution of the wavefunction. On a measurement (which is a particular type of interaction with something outside the system), the collapse happens, and it is at this point that both probabilities and nondeterminism are both introduced. Whatever property is being observed sets an eigenbasis for the measurement. Each eigenspace is assigned a probability of being chosen proportional to the norm -- the sum of the square of the lengths. This probability is the probability that the wavefunction is replaced by the renormalized projection of that wavefunction into the chosen eigenspace.
(This is the simplest version -- it only covers von Neumann measurements in the Schrodinger picture applied to pure states.)
That's not very "MWI" of you! "Collapse" currently has the status of a fantasy which is unsupported by any evidence.
Agreed - MWI (many-worlds interpretation) does not have any "collapse": Instead parts of the wavefunction merely become decoherent with each other which might have the appearance of a collapse locally to observers. I know this is controversial, but I think the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of MWI because it is much more parsimonious than competing models in the sense that really matters - and the only sense in which the parsimony of a model could really be coherently described. (It is kind of funny that both sides of the MWI or !MWI debate tend to refer to parsimony.)
I find it somewhat strange that people who have problems with "all those huge numbers of worlds in MWI" don't have much of a problem with "all those huge numbers of stars and galaxies" in our conventional view of the cosmos - and it doesn't cause them to reach for a theory which has a more complicated basic description but gets rid of all that huge amount of stuff. When did any of us last meet anyone who claimed that "the backs of objects don't exist, except those being observed directly or indirectly by humans because it is more parsimonious not to have them there, even if you need a contrived theory to do away with them"? That’s the problem with arguing against MWI: To reduce the "amount of stuff in reality" - which never normally bothers us with theories, and shouldn't now, you have to introduce contrivance where it is really a bad idea - into the basic theory itself - by introducing some mechanism for "collapse".
Somehow, with all this, there is some kind of cognitive illusion going on. As I don't experience it, I can't identify with it and have no idea what it is.
Well, no, that language is not. But it's the standard language. Of all the interpretations, MWI makes the most sense to me, but quantum mechanics really is "merely" a very good effective model. (See the conflict between SR and QM. QFT neatly dodges some obstacles, but has even more horrendous interpretational issues. And we can only barely torture answers out of it in some limited cases in curved spacetime.)