cousin_it comments on What a reduction of "could" could look like - Less Wrong
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Note that world() essentially doesn't talk about what can happen, instead it talks about how to compute utility, and computation of utility is a single fixed program without parameters (not even depending on the agent), that the agent "controls" from the inside.
To clarify, in the Newcomb example, the preference (world) program could be:
while the agent itself knows its code in the form agent3(). If it can prove both agent1() and agent2() to be equivalent to agent3(), it can decide in exactly the same way, but now the preference program doesn't contain the agent even once, there is no explicit dependency of the world program (utility of the outcome) on the agent's actions. Any dependency is logically inferred.
And we now have a prototype of the notion of preference: a fixed program that computes utility.
Yep - thanks. This is an important idea that I didn't want to burden the post with. It would have brought the argument closer to UDT or ADT research, and I'd much prefer if you and Wei Dai wrote posts on these topics, not me. In matters of ethics and priority, one cannot be too careful. Besides, I want to read your posts because you have different perspectives from mine on these matters.
Thanks, I think I'll write up this notion of preference remark (a little more generally, as a theory not program, with program as a special case, and lack of explicit dependence in the discussion of why the program/theory is "fixed").