cousin_it comments on Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories - Less Wrong
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I wonder if it is possible to go one more step: instead of asking which decision theory to use (to make decisions), we should ask which meta-decision theory we should use (to choose decision theories). In that case, maybe we would find ourselves using EDT for Newcomb-like problems (and winning), but a simpler decision theory for some other problems, where EDT is not required to win.
I don't know what a meta-decision theory would look like (I barely know what a decision theory looks like).
As many of us here secretly hope, the meta-decision theory must "reproduce itself" as the object-level decision theory. Just don't ask me what this means formally.
That makes sense. It implies that we wouldn't find ourselves using different object-level decision theories in different situations.
(But is it possible to construct a problem analogous to Newcomb's on which EDT loses? If so it seems we would need different object-level DTs after all.)
The Smoking Lesion?
As I wrote elsewhere in this thread, see the Newcomb's variant with transparent boxes, or Parfit's Hitchhiker.