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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories - Less Wrong
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That seems bizarre to me too. But if Jimrandomh is filling his boxes on the basis of what most people would do, and most people do one-box, then perhaps they are just behaving as rational, highly correlated, timeless decisionmakers.
A signalling explanation might explain this behavior: people would rather be seen as having gotten the problem correct, or signal non-greediness, than get an extra $0.25. As evidence for this conclusion, some people turn down the $1.00 in box one.
No one's given the real correct solution, which is "inspect the boxes more thoroughly". One of them has an extra label on the bottom, offering an extra $1.00 for finding it if you haven't opened any boxes yet, which I've never had to pay out on. The moral is supposed to be that theory is hard to transfer into the real world and to question assumptions.
You let people inspect the boxes? Wouldn't they be distinguishable by weight?