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CarlShulman comments on Desirable Dispositions and Rational Actions - Less Wrong
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But not as good as the disposition to ignore threats, except when the threats are caused by transparently accidental mental glitches (which would not be encouraged by the disposition).
Eliezer's theory is more-or-less causal decision theory with a different account of dependency hypotheses/counterfactuals. The most relevant philosophical disputes would be about whether to use "local miracle" counterfactuals rather than various backtracking counterfactuals, or logical/mathematical counterfactuals (Eliezer's timeless decision theory idea).
Or reduce counterfactuals and get them out of the analysis of problem statement, rather than explicitly as part of the problem statement.
Decision theories that run on explicit notions of dependency only compete with each other on the correctness of informal dependence analysis established by guidelines (specific to a particular theory) for presenting dependencies. And for each such theory, we can find a problem statement where the guidelines collapse. Actual progress requires understanding where dependencies themselves come from (and for now it's UDT/ADT).