utilitymonster comments on Desirable Dispositions and Rational Actions - Less Wrong

13 Post author: RichardChappell 17 August 2010 03:20AM

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Comment author: utilitymonster 17 August 2010 04:17:59PM *  0 points [-]

What is false is that you ought to have disposition a and do B.

OK. So the argument is this one:

  1. According to two-boxers, you ought to (i) have the disposition to one-box, and (ii) take two boxes.
  2. It is impossible to do (i) and (ii).
  3. Ought implies can.
  4. So two-boxers are wrong.

But, on your use of "disposition", two-boxers reject 1. They do not believe that you should have a FAWS-disposition to one-box, since having a FAWS-disposition to one-box just means "actually taking one box, where this is not a result of randomness". Two-boxers think you should non-randomly choose to take two boxes.

ETA: Some two-boxers may hesitate to agree that you "ought to have a disposition to one-box", even in the philosopher's sense of "disposition". This is because they might want "ought" to only apply to actions; such people would, at most, agree that you ought to make yourself a one-boxer.

Comment author: FAWS 17 August 2010 04:53:10PM *  0 points [-]

From the original post:

Rachel does not envy Irene her choice at all. What she wishes is to have the one-boxer's dispositions, so that the predictor puts a million in the first box, and then to confound all expectations by unpredictably choosing both boxes and reaping the most riches possible.

Richard is probably using disposition in a different sense (possibly the model someone has of someones disposition in my sense) but I believe Eliezer's usage was closer to mine, and either way disposition in my sense is what she would need to actually get the million dollars.