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AdamBell comments on Desirable Dispositions and Rational Actions - Less Wrong
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Which means that one boxing is the better choice because it leads to the better outcome. I say that slightly tongue in cheek because I know you know that but, at the same time, I don't really understand the position that says:
1.) The rational decision is the one that leads to the better outcome. 2.) In Newcomb's Problem one boxing would actually lead to the better outcome. 3.) But the principle of strong dominance suggests that this shouldn't be the case
I don't understand how 3, a statement about how things should be, outweighs 2, a statement about how things are.
It seems like the sensible thing to do is say, well due to point 2, one boxing does lead to the better outcome. Due to point 1, this means one boxing is rational. A side note of this is that strong dominance must not be a rational way of making decisions (in all cases).
No, the choice of one-boxing doesn't lead to the better outcome. It's one's prior possession of the disposition to one-box that leads to the good outcome. It would be best of all to have the general one-boxing disposition and yet (somehow, perhaps flukily) manage to choose both boxes.
(Compare Parfit's case. Ignoring threats doesn't lead to better outcomes. It's merely the possession of the disposition that does so.)
We're going in circles a little aren't we (my fault, I'll grant). Okay, so there are two questions:
1.) Is it a rational choice to one box? Answer: No. 2.) Is it rational to have a disposition to one box? Answer: Yes.
As mentioned earlier, I think I'm more interested in creating a decision theory than wins than one that's rational. But let's say you are interested in a decision theory that captures rationality: It still seems arbitrary to say that the rationality of the choice is more important than the rationality of the decision. Yes, you could argue that choice is the domain of study for decision theory but the number of decision theorists that would one box (outside of LW) suggests that other people have a different idea of what decision theory would be.
I guess my question is this: Is the whole debate over one or two boxing on Newcomb's just a disagreement over which question decision theory should be studying or are there people who use choice to mean the same thing that you do that think one boxing is the rational choice?
I don't understand the distinction between choosing to one-box and being the sort of person who chooses to one-box. Can you formalize that difference?
The latter, I think. (Otherwise, one-boxers would not really be disagreeing with two-boxers. We two-boxers already granted that one-boxing is the better disposition. So if they're merely aiming to construct a theory of desirable dispositions, rather than rational choice, then their claims would be utterly uncontroversial.)
I thought that debate was about free will.