Thanks for posting. Upvoted.

I have always had an uncomfortable feeling whenever I have been asked to include distant-future generations in my utilitarian moral considerations. Intuitively, I draw on my background in economics, and tell myself that the far-distant future should be discounted toward zero weight. But how do I justify the discounting morally? Let me try to sketch an argument.

I will claim that my primary moral responsibility is to the people around me. I also have a lesser responsibility to the next generation, and a responsibility lesser yet to the generation after that, and so on. A steep discount rate - 30% per generation or so. I will do my duty to the next generation, but in turn I expect the next generation to do its duty to the generation after that. After all, the next generation is in a far better position than me to forsee what problems the generation after that really faces. Their efforts will be much less likely than mine to be counterproductive.

If I were to spread my concern over too many generations, I would be shortchanging the next generation of their fair share of my concern. Far-future generations have plenty of predecessor generations to worry about their welfare. The next generation has only us. We mustn't shortchange them!

This argument is just a sketch, of course. I just invented it today. Feedback is welcome.