ShardPhoenix comments on The Importance of Self-Doubt - Less Wrong

23 Post author: multifoliaterose 19 August 2010 10:47PM

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Comment author: Perplexed 20 August 2010 03:22:31PM *  6 points [-]

I use a heuristic which tells me to ignore Pascal-like wagers

I am not sure exactly what using this heuristic entails. I certainly understand the motivation behind the heuristic:

  • when you multiply an astronomical utility (disutility) by a miniscule probability, you may get an ordinary-sized utility (disutility), apparently suitable for comparison with other ordinary-sized utilities. Don't trust the results of this calculation! You have almost certainly made an error in estimating the probability, or the utility, or both.

But how do you turn that (quite rational IMO) lack of trust into an action principle? I can imagine 4 possible precepts:

  • Don't buy lottery tickets
  • Don't buy insurance
  • Don't sell insurance
  • Don't sell back lottery tickets you already own.

Is it rationally consistent to follow all 4 precepts, or is there an inconsistency?

Comment author: ShardPhoenix 21 August 2010 01:54:16AM 1 point [-]

What do those examples have to do with anything? In those cases we actually know the probabilities so they're not Pascal's-Wager-like scenarios.

Comment author: Perplexed 21 August 2010 02:56:01AM 1 point [-]

we actually know the probabilities

So, what is the probability that my house will burn? It may depend on whether I start smoking again. I hope the probability of both is low, but I don't know what it is.

I'm not sure exactly what the definition of Pascal's-Wager-like should be. Is there a definition I should read? Should we ask Prase what he meant? I understood the term to mean anything involving small estimated probabilities and large estimated utilities.

Comment author: ShardPhoenix 21 August 2010 01:11:19PM 0 points [-]

We know the probability to a reasonable level of accuracy - eg consider acturial tables. This is different from things like Pascal's wager where the actual probability may vary by many orders of magnitude from our best estimate.

Comment author: rhollerith_dot_com 21 August 2010 01:28:57PM *  1 point [-]

This is different from things like Pascal's wager where the actual probability may vary by many orders of magnitude from our best estimate.

According to the Bayesians, our best estimate is the actual probability. (According to the frequentists, the probabilities in Pascal's wager are undefined.)

What parent means by "We know the probability to a reasonable level of accuracy - eg consider acturial tables" is that it is possible for a human to give a probability without having to do or estimate a very hairy computation to compute a prior probability (the "starting probability" before any hard evidence is taken into account). ADDED. In other words, it should have been a statement about the difficulty of the computation of the probability, not a statement about the existence of the probability in principle.

Comment author: prase 23 August 2010 02:16:25PM 0 points [-]

It should be a statement about the dependence of the probability on the priors. The more the probability depends on the priors, the less reliable it is.

Comment author: timtyler 21 August 2010 07:03:33AM 0 points [-]

I understood the term to mean anything involving small estimated probabilities and large estimated utilities.

That would be my reading.