prase comments on The Importance of Self-Doubt - Less Wrong

23 Post author: multifoliaterose 19 August 2010 10:47PM

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Comment author: Perplexed 20 August 2010 03:22:31PM *  6 points [-]

I use a heuristic which tells me to ignore Pascal-like wagers

I am not sure exactly what using this heuristic entails. I certainly understand the motivation behind the heuristic:

  • when you multiply an astronomical utility (disutility) by a miniscule probability, you may get an ordinary-sized utility (disutility), apparently suitable for comparison with other ordinary-sized utilities. Don't trust the results of this calculation! You have almost certainly made an error in estimating the probability, or the utility, or both.

But how do you turn that (quite rational IMO) lack of trust into an action principle? I can imagine 4 possible precepts:

  • Don't buy lottery tickets
  • Don't buy insurance
  • Don't sell insurance
  • Don't sell back lottery tickets you already own.

Is it rationally consistent to follow all 4 precepts, or is there an inconsistency?

Comment author: prase 23 August 2010 02:14:16PM 0 points [-]

I indeed am motivated by reasons you gave, so lotteries aren't concern for this heuristics, since the probability is known. In fact, I have never thought about lotteries this way, probably because I know the probabilities. The value estimate is a bit less sure (to resonably buy a lottery, it would also need a convex utility curve, which I probably haven't), but the lotteries deal with money, which make pretty good first approximation for value. Insurances are more or less similar, and not all of them include probabilities too low or values too high to fall into the Pascal-wager category.

Actually, I do buy some most common insurances, although I avoid buying insurances against improbable risks (meteorite fall etc.). I don't buy lotteries.

The more interesting aspect of your question is the status-quo conserving potential inconsistency you have pointed out. I would probably consider real Pascal-wagerish assets to be of no value and sell them if I needed the money. This isn't exactly consistent with the "do nothing" strategy I have outlined, so I have to think about it a while to find out whether the potential inconsistencies are not too horrible.