Perplexed comments on Morality as Parfitian-filtered Decision Theory? - Less Wrong

24 Post author: SilasBarta 30 August 2010 09:37PM

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Tags: evpsych morality decision_theory anthropic

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Comment author: SilasBarta 30 August 2010 11:59:30PM 4 points [-]

What really frustrates me about your article is that you never specify a decision theory, list of decision theories, or category of decision theories that would be likely to survive Parfitian filters.

I thought I did: decision theories that give weight to SAMELs.

I agree with User:Perplexed that one obvious candidate for such a decision theory is the one we seem to actually have: a decision theory that incorporates values like honor, reciprocity, and filial care into its basic utility function. Yet you repeatedly insist that this is not what is actually happening...why? I do not understand.

For the same reason one wouldn't posit "liking Omega" as a good explanation for why someone would pay Omega in the Parfit's Hitchhiker problem.

Comment author: Perplexed 31 August 2010 12:14:44AM 2 points [-]

why? I do not understand.

For the same reason one wouldn't posit "liking Omega" as a good explanation for why someone would pay Omega in the Parfit's Hitchhiker problem.

Could you expand on this? I'm pretty sure that "liking the driver" was not part of my "solution".

I suppose my "honor module" could be called "irrational" .... but, it is something that the hitchhiker is endowed with that he cannot control, no more than he can control his sex drive. And it is evolutionarily a useful thing to have. Or rather, a useful thing to have people believe you have. And people will tend to believe that, even total strangers, if natural selection has made it an observable feature of human nature.

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