torekp comments on Morality as Parfitian-filtered Decision Theory? - Less Wrong

24 Post author: SilasBarta 30 August 2010 09:37PM

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Comment author: Perplexed 30 August 2010 10:59:37PM 7 points [-]

I dislike this. Here is why:

  • I dislike all examples involving omniscient beings.
  • I dislike the suggestion that natural selection finetuned (or filtered) our decision theory to the optimal degree of irrationality which was needed to do well in lost-in-desert situations involving omniscient beings.
  • I would prefer to assume that natural selection endowed us with a rational or near-rational decision theory and then invested its fine tuning into adjusting our utility functions.
  • I would also prefer to assume that natural selection endowed us with sub-conscious body language and other cues which make us very bad at lying.
  • I would prefer to assume that natural selection endowed us with a natural aversion to not keeping promises.
  • Therefore, my analysis of hitchhiker scenarios would involve 3 steps. (1) The hitchhiker rationally promises to pay. (2) the (non-omniscient) driver looks at the body language and estimates a low probability that the promise is a lie, therefore it is rational for the driver to take the hitchhiker into town. (3). The hitchhiker rationally pays because the disutility of paying is outweighed by the disutility of breaking a promise.
  • That is, instead of giving us an irrational decision theory, natural selection tuned the body language, the body language analysis capability, and the "honor" module (disutility for breaking promises) - tuned them so that the average human does well in interaction with other average humans in the kinds of realistic situations that humans face.
  • And it all works with standard game/decision theory from Econ 401. All of morality is there in the utility function as can be measured by standard revealed-preference experiments.

Parental care doesn't force us to modify standard decision theory either. Parents clearly include their children's welfare in their own utility functions.

If you and EY think that the PD players don't like to rat on their friends, all you are saying is that those standard PD payoffs aren't the ones that match the players' real utility functions, because the real functions would include a hefty penalty for being a rat.

Maybe we need a new decision theory for AIs. I don't know; I have barely begun to consider the issues. But we definitely don't need a new one to handle human moral behavior. Not for these three examples, and not if we think that acting morally is rational.

Upvoted simply for bringing these issues into the open.

Comment author: torekp 31 August 2010 01:18:30AM *  0 points [-]

I dislike the suggestion that natural selection finetuned (or filtered) our decision theory to the optimal degree of irrationality

Or for that matter, the (globally) optimal degree of anything. For all we know, much of human morality may be an evolutionary spandrel. Perhaps, like the technological marvel of condoms, parts of morality are fitness-reducing byproducts of generally fitness-enhancing characteristics.

What I do like about the post is its suggestion that paying Omega for the ride is not simply utility-maximizing behavior, but acceptance of a constraint (filter). Robert Nozick used the term "side constraint". That seems descriptively accurate for typical refusals to break promises - more so than anything that can be stated non-tortuously in goal-seeking terms.

Now as a normative thesis, on the other hand, utility-maximization ... also isn't convincing. YMMV.

Comment author: Perplexed 31 August 2010 03:51:47AM 1 point [-]

What I do like about the post is its suggestion that paying Omega for the ride is not simply utility-maximizing behavior, but acceptance of a constraint (filter).

I dislike complicating the theory by using two kinds of entities (utilities and constraints). That strikes me as going one entity "beyond necessity" Furthermore, how do we find out what the constraints are? We have "revealed preference" theory for the utilities. Do you think you can construct a "revealed constraint" algorithm?

Robert Nozick used the term "side constraint". That seems descriptively accurate for typical refusals to break promises - more so than anything that can be stated non-tortuously in goal-seeking terms.

My opinion is exactly the opposite. I have rarely encountered a person who had made a promise which wouldn't be broken if the stakes were high enough. It is not a constraint. It is a (finite) disutility.

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