SilasBarta comments on Morality as Parfitian-filtered Decision Theory? - Less Wrong

24 Post author: SilasBarta 30 August 2010 09:37PM

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Comment author: SilasBarta 01 September 2010 02:28:40PM 1 point [-]

No, because a self-interested agent could regard it as optimal to judge based on that pattern by only looking at causal benefits (CaMELs) to itself. In contrast, an agent could only regard it as optimal to care for offspring (to the extent we observe in parents) based on considering SAMELs, or having a utility function contorted to the point that its actions could more easily be explained by reference to SAMELs.

Comment author: RobinZ 01 September 2010 04:07:22PM *  1 point [-]

Let me try to work this out again, from scratch. A Parfit's hitchhiking involves the following steps in order:

  1. Omega examines the agent.
  2. Omega offers the agent the deal.
  3. The agent accepts the deal.
  4. Omega gives the agent utility.
  5. The agent gives Omega utility.

Parenthood breaks this chain in two ways: first, the "Omega" in step 2 is not the "Omega" in step 4, and neither of these are the "Omega" in step 5; and second, step 1 never occurs. Remember, "natural selection" isn't an agent - it's a process, like supply and demand, that necessarily happens.

Consider, for contrast, division of labor. (Edit: The following scenario is malformed. See followup comment, below.) Let's say that we have Ag, the agent, and Om, the Omega, in the EEA. Om wants to hunt, but Om has children.

  1. Om examines Ag and comes to the conclusion that Ag will cooperate.
  2. Om asks Ag to watch Om's children while on the hunt, in exchange for a portion of the proceeds.
  3. Ag agrees.
  4. Ag watches Om's children while Om hunts.
  5. Om returns successful, and gives Ag a share of the bounty.

Here, all five steps occur in order, Om is Om throughout and Ag is Ag throughout, and both Om and Ag gain utility (meat, in this case) by the exchange.

Does that clarify our disagreement?

Comment author: SilasBarta 01 September 2010 04:37:49PM *  1 point [-]

Does that clarify our disagreement?

Somewhat, but I'm confused:

  • Why does it matter that the Omegas are different? (I dispute that they are, but let's ignore that for now.) The parallel only requires functional equivalence to "whatever Omega would do", not Omega's identity persistence. (And indeed Parfit's other point was that the identity distinction is less clear than we might think.)
  • Why does it matter that natural selection isn't an agent? All that's necessary is that it be an optimization process -- Omega's role in the canonical PH would be no different if it were somehow specified to "just" be an optimization process rather than an agent.
  • What is the purpose of the EEA DoL example? It removes a critical aspect of PH and Parfitian filters -- that optimality requires recognition of SAMELs. Here, if Ag doesn't watch the children, Om sees this and can withhold the share of the bounty. If Ag could only consider CaMELs (and couldn't have anything in its utility function that sneaks in recognition of SAMELs), Ag would still see why it should care for the children.
  • (Wow, that's a lot of abbreviations...)
Comment author: RobinZ 01 September 2010 09:24:52PM 0 points [-]

Taking your objections out of order:

First: yes, I have the scenario wrong - correct would be to switch Ag and Om, and have:

  1. Om examines Ag and comes to the conclusion that Ag will cooperate.
  2. Om offers to watch Ag's children while Ag hunts, in exchange for a portion of the proceeds.
  3. Ag agrees.
  4. Om watches Ag's children while Ag hunts.
  5. Ag returns successful, and gives Om a share of the bounty.

In this case, Om has already given Ag utility - the ability to hunt - on the expectation that Ag will give up utility - meat - at a later time. I will edit in a note indicating the erroneous formulation in the original comment.

Second: what we are comparing are cases where an agent gives no utility to cooperating with Omega, but uses a decision theory that does so because it boosts the agent's utility (e.g. the prototypical case) and cases where the agent gives positive utility to cooperating with Omega (e.g. if the agent and Omega were the same person and the net change is sufficiently positive). What we need to do to determine if the isomorphism with Parfit's hitchhiker is sufficient is to identify a case where the agent's actions will differ.

It seems to me that the latter case, the agent will give utility to Omega even if Omega never gives utility to the agent. Parfit's hitchhikers do not give money to Nomega, the predictor agent who wasn't at the scene and never gave them a ride - they only give money when the SAMEL is present. Therefore: if a parent is willing to make sacrifices when their parent didn't, the Parfit parallel is poor and Theory 2a is the better fit. Agreed?

Comment author: SilasBarta 01 September 2010 10:19:32PM 0 points [-]

I'm not sure I understand all the steps in your reasoning, but I think I can start by responding to your conclusion:

Therefore: if a parent is willing to make sacrifices when their parent didn't, the Parfit parallel is poor and Theory 2a is the better fit. Agreed?

As best I can understand you, yes. If there's e.g. a species that does not care for its young, then one day, one of them does, that action would not be best explained by its recognition (or acting as it if had recognition) of a SAMEL (because there was no "AM") -- it would have to be chalked up to some random change in its psychology.

However -- and this is the important part -- by making that choice, and passing the genes partly responsible for that choice, into the next generation, it opens up the possibility of exploring a new part of the "organism design space": the part which which is improved my modifications predicated on some period of parent-child care [1].

If that change, and further moves into that attractor [2], improve fitness, then future generations will care for their children, with the same psychological impetus as the first one. They feel as if they just care about their children, not that they have to act on a SAMEL. However, 2b remains a superior explanation because it makes fewer assumptions (except for the organism to first have the mutation, which is part of the filter); 2b needn't assume that the welfare of the child is a terminal value.

And note that the combined phenomena do produce functional equivalence to recognition of a SAMEL. If the care-for-children mode enhances fitness, then it is correct to say, "If the organism in n-th generation after mutation did not regard it as optimal to care for the (n+1)th generation, it would not be here", and it is correct to say that that phenomenon is responsible for the organism's decision (such as it is a decision) to care for its offspring. Given these factors, an organism that chooses to care for its offspring is acting equivalently to one motivated by the SAMEL. Thus, 2b can account for the same behavior with fewer assumptions.

As for the EEA DoL arrangement (if the above remarks haven't screened off the point you were making with it): Om can still, er, withhold the children. But let's ignore that possibility on grounds of Least Convenient Possible World. Even so, there are still causal benefits to Ag keeping up its end -- the possibility of making future such arrangements. But let's assume that Ag can still come out ahead by stiffing Om.

In that case, yes, Ag would have to recognize SAMELs to justify paying Om. I'd go on to make the normal point about Ag having already cleaved itself off into the world where there are fewer Om offers if it doesn't see this SAMEL, but honestly, I forgot the point behind this scenario so I'll leave it at that.

(Bitter aside: I wish more of the discussion for my article was like this, rather than being 90% hogged by unrelated arguments about PCT.)

[1] Jaron Lanier refers to this replication mode as "neoteny", which I don't think is the right meaning of the term, but I thought I'd mention it because he discussed the importance of a childhood period in his manifesto that I just read.

[2] I maybe should have added in the article that the reasoning "caring for children = good for fitness" only applies to certain path-dependent domains of attraction in the design space, and doesn't hold for all organisms.

Comment author: RobinZ 01 September 2010 11:01:40PM 0 points [-]

This may not be my true objection (I think it is abundantly clear at this point that I am not adept at identifying my true objections), but I just don't understand your objection to 2a. As far as I can tell, it boils down to "never assume that an agent has terms in its utility functions for other agents", but I'm not assuming - there is an evolutionary advantage to having a term in your utility function for your children. By the optimization criteria of evolution, the only reason not to support a child is if you are convinced that the child is either not related or an evolutionary dead-end (at which point it becomes "no child of mine" or some such). In contrast, the Parfit-hitchhiker mechanism involves upholding contracts, none of which your child offered, and therefore seems an entirely unrelated mechanism at the level of the individual organism.

(Regarding my hypothetical, I was merely trying to demonstrate that I understood the nature of the hypothetical - it has no further significance.)

Comment author: SilasBarta 01 September 2010 11:20:38PM *  1 point [-]

your objection to 2a. As far as I can tell, it boils down to "never assume that an agent has terms in its utility functions for other agents",

No, my objection is: "never assume more terminal values (terms in UF) than necessary", and I've shown how you can get away with not assuming that parents terminally value their children -- just as a theoretical exercise of course, and not to deny the genuine heartfelt love that parents have for their children.

but I'm not assuming - there is an evolutionary advantage to having a term in your utility function for your children.

There is an evolutionary advantage to having a cognitive system that outputs the action "care for children even at cost to self". At a psychological level, this is accomplished by the feeling of "caring" and "love". But is that love due to a utility function weighting, or to a decision theory that (acts as if it recognizes) SAMELs? The mere fact of the psychology, and of the child-favoring acts does not settle this. (Recall the problem of how a ordering of outcomes can be recast as any combination of utility weightings and probabilities.)

You can account for the psychological phenomenon more parsimoniously [1] by assuming the action results from choice-machinery that implicitly recognizes SAMELs -- and on top of that, get a bonus explanation of why a class of reasoning (moral reasoning) feels different -- it's the kind that mustn't be convinced by the lack of a causal benefit to the self.

In contrast, the Parfit-hitchhiker mechanism involves upholding contracts, none of which your child offered, and therefore seems an entirely unrelated mechanism at the level of the individual organism.

My version is precisely written to exclude contracts -- the ideal PH inferences still go through, and so natural selection (which I argue is a PF) is sufficiently similar. If they don't "attach" themselves to a child-favoring decision theory, they simply don't get "rescued" into the n-th generation of that gene's existence. No need to find an isomorphism to a contract.

[1] Holy Shi-ite -- that's three p-words with a different initial consonant sound!

Comment author: RobinZ 02 September 2010 12:49:14AM 0 points [-]

Why does the cognitive system that identifies SAMELs fire when you have a child? The situation is not visibly similar to that of Parfit's hitchhiker. Unless you are suggesting that parenthood simply activates the same precommitment mechanism that the decision theory uses when Parfit-hitchhiking...?

Comment author: SilasBarta 02 September 2010 04:39:18AM 0 points [-]

I don't understand the point of these questions. You're stuck with the same explanatory difficulties with the opposite theory: why does the cognitive system that identifies _changes in utility function_ fire when you have a child? Does parenthood activate the same terminal values that a PH survivor does upon waking up?

Comment author: Perplexed 02 September 2010 04:53:13AM 1 point [-]

A utility function need not change when a child is born. After all, a utility function is a mapping from states-of-the-world to utilities and the birth of a child is merely a change in the state of the world.

Nonetheless, utility mapping functions can change as a result of information which doesn't betoken a change in the state-of-the-world, but merely in your understanding your own desires. For example, your first taste of garlic ice cream. Or, more to the point, new parents sometimes report dramatic changes in outlook simply from observation of their baby's first smile. The world has not changed, but somehow your place within it has.

Comment author: RobinZ 02 September 2010 06:31:08AM 0 points [-]

As Perplexed said, there is no requirement that the utility function change - and, in fact, no reason to believe that it does not already have positive terms for children before reproduction. A lot of people report wanting children.

I'm asking these questions because we clearly have not established agreement, and I want to determine why. I assume that either we are using conflicting data, applying incompatible rules of inference, or simply misreading each other's writing. It was this last possibility I was probing with that last question.