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Perplexed comments on Morality as Parfitian-filtered Decision Theory? - Less Wrong
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That is a legitimate concern. Can you think of two mutually contradictory moral positions than could both be plausibly argued using this approach?
/sets timer for 2 min
The best I can do is think of a case where two Parfitian imperatives clash: i.e., a conflict between two of these counterfactual imperatives. Not a very strong objection at all, but then I am sympathetic to the theory evinced here & do not trust my ability to see its flaws.
Any system that permits the derivation of "ought" from "is" is susceptible to having people with differing experiences regarding "is" come to different conclusions regarding "ought".