RobinZ comments on Morality as Parfitian-filtered Decision Theory? - Less Wrong

24 Post author: SilasBarta 30 August 2010 09:37PM

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Tags: evpsych morality decision_theory anthropic

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Comment author: RobinZ 02 September 2010 06:31:08AM 0 points [-]

As Perplexed said, there is no requirement that the utility function change - and, in fact, no reason to believe that it does not already have positive terms for children before reproduction. A lot of people report wanting children.

I'm asking these questions because we clearly have not established agreement, and I want to determine why. I assume that either we are using conflicting data, applying incompatible rules of inference, or simply misreading each other's writing. It was this last possibility I was probing with that last question.

Comment author: SilasBarta 02 September 2010 05:07:24PM *  2 points [-]

As Perplexed said, there is no requirement that the utility function change - and, in fact, no reason to believe that it does not already have positive terms for children before reproduction. A lot of people report wanting children.

Okay, but by the same token, there's no need to assume recognition of the SAMEL (that favors producing and caring for children) changes. (And if it matters, a lot of people report not wanting children, but then wanting to care for their children upon involuntary parenthood.)

None of the things you're pointing out seem to differentiate the utility function-term explanation from the SAMEL-recognition explanation.

Comment author: RobinZ 02 September 2010 05:48:02PM 0 points [-]

(And if it matters, a lot of people report not wanting children, but then wanting to care for their children upon involuntary parenthood.)

That's a test that favors the SAMEL explanation, I think.

Comment author: SilasBarta 02 September 2010 07:03:59PM 0 points [-]

So you're agreeing with me in this one respect? (I don't mean to sound confrontational, I just want to make sure you didn't reverse something by accident.)

Comment author: RobinZ 04 September 2010 02:39:41PM 0 points [-]

Right - here's what I've got.

The pattern of "not wanting children, but then wanting to spend resources to care for the children" is better explained by a SAMEL pattern than by a utility function pattern. The fact of people wanting children can be sufficiently explained by the reasons people give for wanting children: a desire for a legacy, an expected sense of fulfillment from parenthood, etcetera. Finally, the fact that this is a SAMEL pattern doesn't mean that the adaptation works on SAMEL patterns - the ability of Parfit's hitchhiker to precommit to paying Omega is a separate adaptation from the childrearing instinct.

Comment author: SilasBarta 05 September 2010 03:40:19PM 0 points [-]

I'm still not following:

  • How does "not wanting children, but then wanting to spend resources to care for the children" involve SAMELs in a way that wanting to have children does not?
  • Yes, you can explain people's pursuance of goals by the reasons they say. The problem is that this isn't the best explanation. As you keep adding new terminal values to explain the actions, you complicate the explanation. If you can do without these -- and I think I've shown you can -- you're left with a superior explanation.
  • The fact that it feels like "pursuing a legacy" on the inside does not favor that being the superior explanation. Remember, the desire to pay Omega in PH feels like gratefulness on the inside -- like the Omega has some otherwise inherent deservedness of receiving the payment. But in both cases, "If the survivor did not regard it as optimal to pay, the survivor would not be here", and the SAMEL explanation only requires that humans have choice-machinery that favors acting on these (already given) facts.
  • There is no pre-commitment on the part of human hitchhikers in the sense that they are inextricably bound to pay -- they are still making a choice, even though selection has been applied on the set of hitchhikers. It is not their precommitment that leads them to pay, but their choice-machinery's having alerted them to the optimality of doing so -- which feels like gratefulness.
Comment author: RobinZ 05 September 2010 10:22:55PM 0 points [-]
  • My tongue detects sweetness, not healthfulness, even though the process that created the adaptation was designed to recognize healthfulness.
  • Not everyone wants children, as you said. It is not evolutionarily necessary for people to want children - only for them to want sex. That anyone wants children might be explained by the reasons they actually give for wanting children.
  • See above.
  • I am not invested in the word "precommitment" - we are describing the same behavior on the part of the hitchhiker.
Comment author: SilasBarta 07 September 2010 02:36:32PM *  1 point [-]

My tongue detects sweetness, not healthfulness, even though the process that created the adaptation was designed to recognize healthfulness.

This is the crux of the matter - desire for energy-dense consumables was selected for because quickly gathering energy was adaptive. It feels like sweetness from the inside: this is the region of qualiaspace that corresponds to feeling a motivation to act on that means-ends link. It does not feel like quickly gathering energy. Similarly, being motivated by SAMELs needn't feel like such a recognition -- it feels like an "otherwise-ungrounded inherent deservedness of others of being treated well" (or badly).

Not everyone wants children, as you said. It is not evolutionarily necessary for people to want children - only for them to want sex. That anyone wants children might be explained by the reasons they actually give for wanting children. I am not invested in the word "precommitment" - we are describing the same behavior on the part of the hitchhiker.

Okay, reviewing your point, I have to partially agree -- general desire to act on SAMELs need not be (and probably isn't) the same choice machinery that motivates specific child-bearing acts. The purpose of the situation was to show how you can account for behavior without complicating the utility function. Rather than additionally positing that someone terminally values their children, we can say that they are self-interested, but that only certain decision theories ever make it to the next generation.

In both cases, we have to rely on "if they did not regard it as optimal to care for their children (and given genetic psychological continuity), they would not be there", but only in 2a must we elevate this caring to a terminal value for purposes of explanation.

Comment author: Leonhart 07 September 2010 02:59:00PM 2 points [-]

It feels like sweetness from the inside: this is the region of qualiaspace that corresponds to feeling a motivation to act on that means-ends link.

This is good, but

It does not feel like quickly gathering energy.

is still hiding some confusion (in me, anyway.) Why say that it doesn't feel like quickly gathering energy? What would feel like quickly gathering energy?

I'm now imagining a sucking-in-lines-qualia, (warning tvtropes) lurking in a region of qualia-space only accessible to sentient energy weaponry. And I'm kinda jealous.

Comment author: SilasBarta 07 September 2010 03:17:37PM *  2 points [-]

is still hiding some confusion (in me, anyway.) Why say that it doesn't feel like quickly gathering energy?

Getting a nutrient feed via IV doesn't feel like sweetness, but does involve quickly getting energy.

What would feel like quickly gathering energy?

If you had a cognitive system that directly recognized any gain in energy, and credited it as good, for that reason, then you would have a quale that is best described as "feeling like gathering energy". But that requires a whole different architecture.

Comment author: RobinZ 07 September 2010 04:14:24PM 0 points [-]

It sounds like we agree.

Comment author: SilasBarta 07 September 2010 04:48:20PM -2 points [-]

Including about my claim that it provides a more parsimonious explanation of parents' actions not to include concern for their children as a terminal value?

Comment author: RobinZ 02 September 2010 07:18:49PM 0 points [-]

I spoke correctly - I didn't express agreement on the broader issue because I don't want to update too hastily. I'm still thinking.

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