A problem with Pascal's Mugging arguments is that once you commit yourself to taking seriously very unlikely events (because they are multiplied by huge potential utilities), if you want to be consistent, you must take into account all potentially relevant unlikely events, not just the ones that point in your desired direction.

To be sure, you can come up with a story in which SIAI with probability epsilon makes a key positive difference, for bignum expected lives saved. But by the same token you can come up with stories in which SIAI with probability epsilon makes a key negative difference (e.g. by convincing people to abandon fruitful lines of research for fruitless ones), for bignum expected lives lost. Similarly, you can come up with stories in which even a small amount of resources spent elsewhere, with probability epsilon makes a key positive difference (e.g. a child saved from death by potentially curable disease, may grow up to make a critical scientific breakthrough or play a role in preserving world peace), for bignum expected lives saved.

Intuition would have us reject Pascal's Mugging, but when you think it through in full detail, the logical conclusion is that we should... reject Pascal's Mugging. It does actually reduce to normality.