The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory

This is part of a sequence titled "An introduction to decision theory". The previous post was Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories

For various reasons I've decided to finish this sequence on a seperate blog. This is principally because there were a large number of people who seemed to feel that this sequence either wasn't up to the Less Wrong standard or felt that it was simply covering ground that had already been covered on Less Wrong.

The decision to post it on another blog rather than simply discontinuing it came down to the fact that other people seemed to feel that the sequence had value. Those people can continue reading it at "The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory".

Alternatively, there is a sequence index available: Less Wrong and decision theory: sequence index

This is part of a sequence titled "An introduction to decision theory". The previous post was Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories

Alternatively, there is a sequence index available: Less Wrong and decision theory: sequence index

Actually, this is excellent. We could rewrite Newcomb's problem like this:

Omega places in the box together with the million or non-million, a device that influences your brain, programming the device so that you are caused to take both if it does not place the million, and programming the device so that you are caused to one-box if it places the million. In other words, Omega decides in advance whether you are going to get the million or not, then sets up the situation so you will make the choice that gets you what it wanted you to get.

However, the influence on your brain is quite subtle; to you, it still feels like you are deciding in the normal way, using some decision theory or other.

Now, do you one-box or two-box? This is certainly exactly the same as the smoking lesion. Nor can you answer "I don't have to decide because my actions are determined" because your actions might well be determined in real life anyway, and you still have to decide.

If you one-box here, you should not smoke in the lesion problem. If you don't one-box here... well, too bad for you.

Now, do you one-box or two-box?

The obvious answer is ‘whatever Omega decided’. But I hope that I one-box.

-1Kingreaper16y

I do whatever I'm being influenced into doing. This is a fact. You can argue all you like about what I should do, but what I will do is already decided, and isn't influenced by my thoughts, my rationality, or anything else. All the information needed to determine what I will do is in the lesion/machine. Applying rationality to a scenario where the agent is by definition incapable of rationality is just plain silly.