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TobyBartels comments on The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory - Less Wrong
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For the correlation with Omega to be 100%, one-boxing would have to be ABSOLUTELY IRRESISTABLE when there was a million in the box...
Hence, if there was a million, the person would one-box. He wouldn't be able to resist doing so...
And of course taking only one box would have to be ABSOLUTELY UNTHINKABLE for people when the million wasn't there.
And so on.
Well, yeah, which is why people resist the story about Omega, think it must be nonsense, and decide to two-box (although it would be better to explicitly reject the story). Or interpret it to imply backwards causality (in which case even CDT makes you one-box) or something else that violates the laws of physics as I know them.
This is one reason to stick with probabilistic versions of Newcomb's Paradox.
In both cases (Newcomb's Paradox and the Smoking Lesion), this seems to another example of the difficulty with 0 and 1 as probabilities.