In real life, your decision doesn't depend on how you decide it. It just depends on the positions of your atoms and the laws of physics. So you might as well just decide arbitrarily, and save effort.
I would one-box.
So, if Omega programmed you to two-box, you would one-box?
That's not exactly consistent. In fact, that's logically impossible.
Essentially, you're denying your own scenario.
This is part of a sequence titled "An introduction to decision theory". The previous post was Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories
For various reasons I've decided to finish this sequence on a seperate blog. This is principally because there were a large number of people who seemed to feel that this sequence either wasn't up to the Less Wrong standard or felt that it was simply covering ground that had already been covered on Less Wrong.
The decision to post it on another blog rather than simply discontinuing it came down to the fact that other people seemed to feel that the sequence had value. Those people can continue reading it at "The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory".
Alternatively, there is a sequence index available: Less Wrong and decision theory: sequence index