JamesAndrix comments on The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory - Less Wrong

3 [deleted] 23 August 2010 09:01AM

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Comment author: Unknowns 23 August 2010 12:29:49PM *  1 point [-]

You can say the same thing about Newcomb's problem. It doesn't mean you can choose whether or not there will be a million in one of the boxes. It means that if there is a million in one of the boxes, then "some combination of logic, rationalisation or impulse will make you decide" to choose only one of the boxes (and if there's no million, then similarly you'll end up taking both boxes.) "You can then tell from your decision whether" you'll get the million or not, "but you couldn't have made the other decision, no matter what."

Either that, or you can be the first to outguess Omega and get the million as well as the thousand...

Nope, this reasoning doesn't work with Newcomb, and it doesn't work with the Smoking Lesion. If you want to win, you one-box, and you don't smoke.

Comment author: JamesAndrix 23 August 2010 08:19:18PM -2 points [-]

It doesn't mean you can choose whether or not there will be a million in one of the boxes.

Yes I can, right now.