Do you have the option of not sleeping for the next year?
No, I don't. However, feeling of irresistible temptation is not the same thing as 100% incidence within respective population. (There are people who claim they don't sleep.)
Imagine you lived in a lesion world where most of the smokers described their decision to start smoking as "free". Still, there was a 100% correlation between smoking and cancer. Do you find it impossible?
No, it's entirely possible.
It's also entirely possible in the lightbulb world. In the lightbulb world I suspect you'd agree it isn't a free decision, but it's entirely possible that the people of that world might claim that it was.
This is part of a sequence titled "An introduction to decision theory". The previous post was Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories
For various reasons I've decided to finish this sequence on a seperate blog. This is principally because there were a large number of people who seemed to feel that this sequence either wasn't up to the Less Wrong standard or felt that it was simply covering ground that had already been covered on Less Wrong.
The decision to post it on another blog rather than simply discontinuing it came down to the fact that other people seemed to feel that the sequence had value. Those people can continue reading it at "The Smoking Lesion: A problem for evidential decision theory".
Alternatively, there is a sequence index available: Less Wrong and decision theory: sequence index