I felt like I didn't get the informativeness I bargained for, somehow. Your list of requirements for a rational conversation and your definition of a moral rational decision seem reasonable, but straightforward; even after reading your long exposition, I didn't really find out why these are interesting definitions to arrive at.
EDIT: One caveat is that it's not totally clear to me where the line between "ethical" goals and other goals lies, if there is such a line. Consequently, I don't know how to distinguish between a moral rational decision and just a plain old rational decision. Are ethical goals ones that have a larger influence on other people?
(In particular, I didn't understand the point of contention in the comment thread you linked to, that prompted this post. It seems pretty obvious to me that rationality in a moral context is the same as rationality in any other context; making decisions that are best suited to fulfilling your goals. You never really did address his final question of "how can a terminal value be rational" (my answer would be that it's nonsense to call a value rational or irrational.))
I'm not sure it's important that my conclusions be "interesting". The point was that we needed a guideline (or set thereof), and as far as I know this need has not been previously met.
Once we agree on a set of guidelines, then I can go on to show examples of rational moral decisions -- or possibly not, in which case I update my understanding of reality.
Re ethical vs. other kinds: I'm inclined to agree. I was answering an argument that there is no such thing as a rational moral decision. Jack drew this distinction, not me. Yes, I took way too long...
Query: by what objective criteria do we determine whether a political decision is rational?
I propose that the key elements -- necessary but not sufficient -- are (where "you" refers collectively to everyone involved in the decisionmaking process):
If an argument satisfies all of these requirements, it is at least provisionally rational. If it fails any one of them, then it's not rational and needs to be corrected or discarded.
This is not a circular definition (defining "rationality" by referring to "reasonable" things, where "reasonable" depends on people being "rational"); it is more like a recursive algorithm, where large ambiguous problems are split up into smaller and smaller sub-problems until we get to a size where the ambiguity is negligible.
This is not one great moral principle; it is more like a self-modifying working process (subject to rational criticism and therefore improvable over time -- optimization by successive approximation). It is an attempt to apply the processes of science (or at least the same reasoning which arrived at those processes) to political discourse.
So... can we agree on this?
This is a hugely, vastly, mindbogglingly trimmed-down version of what I originally posted. All comments prior to 2010-08-26 20:52 (EDT) refer to that version, which I have reposted here for comparison purposes and for the morbidly curious. (It got voted down to negative 6. Twice.)