If there isn't one, why do you assume computationalism? I find it stunningly implausible that the mere specification of formal relationships among abstract concepts is sufficient to reify those concepts, i.e., to cause them to actually exist.

This isn't actually what I meant by computationalism (although I was using the word from memory, and my concept may differ from the philosopher's definition).

The idea that mere specification of formal relationships, that mere math in theory, can cause worlds to exist is a separate position than basic computationalism, and I don't buy it.

A formal mathematical system needs to actually be computed to be real. That is what causes time to flow in the child virtual universe. And in our physics, that requires energy in the parent universe. It also requires mass to represent bits. So computation can't just arise out of nothing - it requires computational elements in a parent universe organized in the right way.

khafra's replies are delving deeper into the philosophical background, so I don't need to add much more