While you may find appeals to arguments from the regression to the mean to be "horrendously bad", I can only report that, so far as I have been able to make out, the logical legitimacy of such arguments is pretty much taken for granted among the disputants on both sides of the IQ nature/nurture controversy.
The first link you point to, which seems most directly to address the issue of regression to the mean, in turn points to papers which were written about 30 years ago or more, without, it seems, anyone in the dispute taking them seriously.
Don't you think that that would suggest that there's something deficient in the argument that use of regression to the mean in this context is a logical fallacy?
Here's the basic problem with claiming that regression to the mean in the context of, say, human traits is simply some mathematical artifact: it does nothing to explain WHY there should be a regression to the mean.
Yes, not only do the average IQs (or heights) of children regress to the mean from the average IQs of their parents; the opposite is also true -- the average IQs (or heights) of parents regress to the mean from the average IQs of their children. Does that mean that there is no causal relation established by regression to the mean effects? No, absolutely not. It only establishes that the direction of a causal arrow can't be determined from the fact of regression to the mean alone. But we know the direction of that arrow, if the cause is genetic (or environmental, presumably): it goes from parents to children, not the other way around. When we understand this, we can also explain why we see regression to the mean in the other direction as well; the same underlying set of causes are working, though, again, the direction of the causal arrow is opposite.
The fact of regression to the mean strongly argues that there is SOME underlying causal mechanism (be it genetic or environmental or a combination) that explains that fact. Why is it that the children of high IQ parents regress partly to the mean, but not all the way?
Regression to the mean in traits in both directions, from children to parents and vice versa, can be explained by luck -- those parents or children who have greater IQs or greater heights are, on average, luckier than average; they are, in particular, luckier than their own children or parents, respectively. But what are they luckier AT? What have they received more of? If one says, genes that increase the trait in question, then a perfectly coherent explanation emerges. One might say that they've received a better environment -- but that becomes a very difficult explanation in the case of IQ, since typically quite the opposite seems to be true (parents with high IQs have on average greater incomes and generally should establish a better environment for their children than they themselves experienced.)
In short, the existence of regression to the mean in the expression of traits across generations presents an important fact -- one that one might not a priori expect. Something must explain that fact. Do you seriously think that that explanatory problem simply goes away by declaring that appeals to regression to the mean constitute a "logical fallacy"?
liberalbiorealist:
...While you may find appeals to arguments from the regression to the mean to be "horrendously bad", I can only report that, so far as I have been able to make out, the logical legitimacy of such arguments is pretty much taken for granted among the disputants on both sides of the IQ nature/nurture controversy.
The first link you point to, which seems most directly to address the issue of regression to the mean, in turn points to papers which were written about 30 years ago or more, without, it seems, anyone in the dispute taking t
Several Less Wrong posters [1], [2], [3] have cited the interview with James Shikwati titled "For God's Sake, Please Stop the Aid!" as evidence that Western aid to Africa is actively destructive to Africa. According to the wikipedia page on James Shikwati:
I think it's important for those interested in the question of whether developing world aid is effective to look to those who can point to formal studies about the effectiveness of African aid rather than basing their judgments on quotes from individuals whose opinions may very well have been heavily skewed by selection bias and/or driven by ideological considerations which have nothing to do with the available evidence.
Engaging with the evidence in detail is a very time-consuming task and one beyond the scope of this blog entry. I will however quote various experts with links to useful references.
Divided Views On Overall Impact of Developing World Aid:
I've found Paul Collier to be apparently even-handed. Readers interested in studying the the effectiveness of developing world aid may like to study Paul Collier's papers on the subject. Paul Collier summarizes his views in his recent book titled The Bottom Billion.
An economist who is skeptical of Collier's analysis William Easterly, the author of The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. For those who are interested in the topic of the effectiveness of developing world aid, Easterly's papers are also worth taking a look at. In an article for Boston Review, Easterly writes:
My overall impression is that there's a fair amount of controversy as to whether African aid has increased economic growth in Africa. Different economists have different views and the evidence available does not seem sufficiently robust to support a confident belief that the net effect of aid has been positive or negative.
Much less controversial is the view that the best health Western interventions can and do systematically improve health in Africa.
The Case of Health:
In his article titled Can The West Save Africa? Easterly writes
According to the GiveWell page titled Why do we look for charities implementing proven programs:
Charities working on improving health in the developing world have variable effectiveness. It's plausible that by donating to one of GiveWell's top-rated charities one can have a substantially stronger positive effect than the one associated to a random such charity. In Charity Isn't About Helping? Holden says:
A Note on Malthusian Problems:
Those who are concerned about possible future Malthusian problems attached to saving lives should see Holden's email to the GiveWell research mailing list titled Population growth & health, the video linked therein, and papers by the speaker Hans Rosling. I presently believe that while it's possible that saving lives in the developing world does more harm than good on account of Malthusian problem, this is fairly unlikely and the expected value of saving lives in the developing world is strongly positive. Of course, my belief is subject to change with incoming evidence.
The Giving What We Can (GWWC) Myths About Aid page provides a suggestion for donors who are concerned about future Malthusian problems:
GWWC and GiveWell differ in that GWWC's top recommended charities are Schistosomiasis Control Initiative and Deworm the World which focus on neglected tropical diesease whereas GiveWell does not recommend these organizations. Holden explains GiveWell's position in Neglected Tropical Disease charities: Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, Deworm The World.
A Note on Overcorrecting Bias:
Many people's initial naive reaction to developing world aid is that it's a very good idea. This was certainly my own reaction as a child when I learned of Unicef. As Eliezer suggests in Can't Say No To Spending, there's a natural bias in favor of saying "yes" when asked to donate money help poor people - saying 'no' feels cold-hearted. Reading an author like Shikwati can dispel this bias by making possible unintended negative consequences salient, but often at the cost of giving rise to a new bias against developing world aid. Reading Sachs' remarks on Shikwati quoted in the introduction of this article can dispel this bias at the cost of introducing a new bias in favor of developing world aid. But Sachs' own position has garnered seemingly valid criticism from William Easterly and others - learning of this introduces a bias against Sachs and his views and in favor of Easterly and his views. There's the usual issue of there being a halo effect as described in Yvain's excellent article titled The Trouble with "Good" - when person X debunks person Y's apparently erroneous claim, this makes person X look unwarrentedly superior to person Y overall.
It's difficult to know who to trust when ostensible experts disagree, any of whom may be exhibiting motivated cognition or even engaging in outright conscious self-serving deception. Nevertheless, one can reasonably can hope to arrive at a fairly good epistemological state by:
Habits (1)-(4) are conducive to converging on a relatively accurate epistemological position on a given matter.
Acknowledgment: Thanks to Carl Shulman for useful references and discussion about the subject of this article.