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AnlamK comments on Is Rationality Maximization of Expected Value? - Less Wrong
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The whole nonlinear utility thing makes this specific point wrong, but:
It seems like the main counter-intuitive part of expected utility theory (or counter-expected utility theory part of intuition) is just this type of question. See: Pascal's Mugging.
Humans tend to be loathe to trade of high probabilities of small benefits for low probabilities of big benefits in cases where linearity is very plausible, such as # of people saved.
But people seem to just as often make the opposite mistake about various scary risks.
Are people just bad at dealing with small probabilities?
What does that mean for coming to a reflective equilibrium about ethics?
The nonlinear utility of money?
Well, the point I was trying to make was supposed to be abstract and general. Nick Bostrom's Pascal's Mugging piece argues for a very similar (if not identical) point. Thanks for letting me know about this.
And yes, I'm bad at dealing with small probabilities. I feel that these evoke some philosophical questions about the nature of probability in general - or whatever we talk about when we talk about probabilities.