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John_Maxwell_IV comments on Really Extreme Altruism - Less Wrong
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Optimizing your decisions so that other people will form less accurate beliefs is dishonesty. Making literally false statements you expect other people to believe is just a special case of this.
If you decide not to reveal info because you predict that info will enable another person to accurately predict your behavior and decline to enter an agreement with you, you are being dishonest.
Hm, I wrote that comment two years ago. My new view is that it's not much worth arguing over the definition of "dishonesty" so figuring out whether the guy is "dishonest" or not is just a word game--we should figure out if others having correct beliefs is a terminal value to us, and if so, how it trades off against other terminal values. (Or perhaps individually not acting in ways that give others incorrect beliefs is a terminal value.)
As a consequentialist, I mostly say the ends justify the means. I am a little cautious due to the issues Eliezer discusses in this post, but I don't think I'm as cautious as Eliezer is--I have a fair amount of confidence in my ability to notice when my brain is going in to a failure mode like he describes.